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ABSTRACT
The competitive environment of a firm shapes its financial policies. With the rise in the con-
centration of US industries, fewer listed firms, and reduced competition, questions about the effect
of competition on firm behavior and policies are relevant and pertinent. In this research, I explore
the effect of changes in competition on firm behavior. I do this in two settings.
First, I study if the product pricing effects of common ownership, when the same investors
partially own two firms, are ubiquitous or if they vary based on the product market characteristics
of the firm. I find that the anti-competitive effects of common ownership are present only in
industries with similar products. Using a quasi-natural experiment, I find when firms with similar
products experience an increase in common ownership, they have 3.2 percentage point higher
industry-adjusted gross margin, reduce their R&D expenditures by 0.6 percentage point and have
improved profitability. My findings show that common ownership worsens competition only when
firms operate in relatively similar product spaces.
Second, along with my co-authors, I study how managerial traits affect firms’ responses to
competitive shocks. Specifically, motivated by studies that show overconfident agents are more
competitive, we test whether overconfident CEOs respond differently and perform better when
competition increases. Using tariff reductions as exogenous shocks to competition and a triple-
difference specification on matched samples, we find that when competition increases, firms with
overconfident CEOs slash their operating and gross profit margins, and increase advertising and
research and development more intensively than rational CEOs do. Their actions lead to increased
market share and value for their firms relative to firms led by rational CEOs. Our results imply that
CEO overconfidence is beneficial when firms face increased competition.
ii
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1. INTRODUCTION
According to the theory of the firm, the primary objective of a firm is to maximize shareholder
value. In order to maximize firm value, a firm must allocate its resources efficiently to compete ef-
fectively and maximize profits. Several factors determine a firm’s ability to compete. Furthermore,
firms respond to changes in competition by changing corporate policies. For instance, several pa-
per documents that a firm’s capital structure and product market outcomes are related. Chevalier
(1995) finds that increase in leverage led to reduced product market competition in the supermarket
industry. Kovenock and Phillips (1997) find that firms in concentrated industries close plants and
reduce investments post leveraged buyouts. Xu (2012) finds that firms reduce leverage in response
to an increase in competition. Moreover, product market competition affects disclosure policies
(Ali, Klasa, and Yeung (2014), Darrough and Stoughton (1990), etc.), mitigates managerial slack
(Giroud and Mueller (2010)), affects investment decisions (Akdogu and MacKay (2008), Frésard
and Valta (2015)), and increases CEO turnover (Aldunate (2018)).
In this dissertation, I study two facets of product market competition and firms’ responses to
it. The first chapter of my dissertation examines the effects of ownership structure on the com-
petitive environment and product market outcomes of a firm. With an increase in institutional
ownership, as of 2014, 60% of all publicly listed firms share at least one blockholder with an
industry-peer (He and Huang (2017)). The increase in common ownership, when peer-firms are
(at least partially) owned by the same set of investors, reduces the incentive for a firm to compete
and as a result, product prices increase (Rotemberg (1984), Farrell (1985)). Empirical studies have
found mixed evidence on the effect of common ownership on product prices and corporate policies
(see: Schmalz (2018) and Lewellen and Lowry (2019) for an excellent review of the literature).
Given that competition between two firms is a function of their product characteristics (Chamber-
lin (1933), Robinson (1933)), I argue that the anti-competitive effects of common ownership are
stronger for firms with similar products than for firms with differentiated products.
Using mergers and acquisitions of financial institutions as an exogenous shock to a common
1
ownership levels of a firm, I find that, compared to firms with differentiated products, firms with
similar products have higher gross margins, lower R&D expenditures, and higher profitability
when their common ownership increases. Moreover, I show that the effects of common ownership
are present only in industries with high product similarity and are absent or opposite in industries
with differentiated products. I conduct several robustness tests. Finally, using Bushee (1998)’s
classification to identify institutional investor types, I find that the results are driven by long-term
investors.
In the second chapter of my dissertation, co-authored with Shane A. Johnson, T. Colin Camp-
bell, and Binday Adhikari, we examine how behavioral biases of managers can affect firm value
when faced with an increase in competition. Empirical research shows that managerial biases, par-
ticularly CEO overconfidence, affects corporate policies. Overconfident CEOs are associated with
corporate fraud and litigation (Schrand and Zechman (2012); Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, Nanda,
and Tham (2018)), value-destroying acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate (2008)), and weaker lend-
ing standards resulting in higher loan defaults (Ho, Huang, Lin, and Yen (2016)). Given the neg-
ative effects of overconfidence, the question arises why do firms employ overconfident CEOs? A
few studies have attempted to explain this question, for instance, Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012)
and Galasso and Simcoe (2011) find that firms with overconfident CEOs innovate more. Campbell,
Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley (2011) find that moderately overconfident CEOs are
less likely to be forced out. Phua, Tham, and Wei (2018) find that overconfident CEOs cultivate
stronger commitments with suppliers and customers.
Motivated by studies that find that overconfident agents are more competitive (Camerer and
Lovallo (1999)), in this paper, we hypothesize and test whether overconfident CEOs perform bet-
ter when product market competition increases. Using import tariff reductions, which made U.S.
domestic firms more susceptible to competition from foreign firms, we find that firms with over-
confident CEOs respond more aggressively to changes in competition. These firms sharply cut
prices (as proxied by gross margin and operating margin) in the years following tariff cuts. More-
over, during this period firms with overconfident CEOs increase R&D expenditures and advertising
2
expenditures, potentially to differentiate their products. These actions resulted in firms with over-
confident CEOs gaining market share and increasing firm value. We conduct several placebo tests
to establish that the results are driven by differences between overconfident and rational CEOs.
My dissertation contributes to the literature in several meaningful ways. First, the finding that
the anti-competitive effects of common ownership accrue to firms that have similar products inform
the debate on common ownership. To the extent that common ownership reduces competition, pol-
icymakers may consider taking steps to curb the anti-competitive effects of common ownership.
Several academics suggest that antitrust agencies should consider the effects of common owner-
ship when reviewing merger deals (Elhauge (2016)) and should limit institutional investors from
investing in multiple firms in the same industry (Posner, Scott Morton, and Weyl (2017)). How-
ever, the findings of my paper suggest that the effects of common ownership are not uniform and
are non-linear across industries. Therefore, any policy implication should take into account the
product characteristics of the firms. I also show that using a 5% threshold to identify investors may
fall short because it ignores potentially large dollar holdings in big firms.
The findings that overconfident CEOs may improve firm value adds to a growing literature that
documents the potential upside of hiring overconfident managers. Prior work examining invest-
ment and other corporate policies confirm that overconfidence can lead to inferior outcomes. In
a competitive setting, however, our results show that, compared to rational CEO, overconfident
CEOs responses are value-increasing. Thus, their biases turn out to be beneficial because they
‘win.’ Our results underscore that the value of CEO overconfidence can depend critically on the
level of competition that a firm faces. Finally, the second chapter of my dissertation highlights
the importance of managerial characteristics on product market outcomes. Empirical work has
documented that firms’ characteristics affect their product market outcomes. Our paper finds that
the competitive advantage of a firm may also depend on the manager of the firm. The finding
that overconfident CEOs react differently to changes in import competition showcases the impor-
tance of considering heterogeneity in managerial characteristics in a firm’s response to changes in
product market competition due to import tariff reduction.
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2. WHEN DOES COMMON OWNERSHIP MATTER?
2.1 Introduction
Recent empirical work finds that an increase in common ownership1 is associated with higher
product pricing in the airline (Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu (2018)) and the banking industries (Azar,
Raina, and Schmalz (2016)).2 These findings have sparked policy debates on how to curb the
potential anti-competitive effects of common ownership. Some academics suggest that antitrust
agencies like the Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) should
consider common ownership of firms when reviewing mergers and acquisitions (Elhauge (2016)).
Others recommend limiting institutional investors from investing in multiple firms in an industry
(Posner, Scott Morton, and Weyl (2017)).3 However, competitive interactions among firms are of-
ten a function of their product characteristics (Chamberlin (1933), Robinson (1933)). Therefore, an
important and unanswered question is whether the anti-competitive effects of common ownership
are pervasive or do they depend upon other competitive features of a firm’s product space. In this
paper, I test whether the pricing effects of common ownership are concentrated in certain indus-
tries or exist across all or most industries. I find that the potential anti-competitive pricing effects
of common ownership are strongest in industries with more similar products and are statistically
indistinguishable from zero in industries with differentiated products.
Theoretically, common ownership among firms can result in higher price levels (Rotemberg
(1984), Farrell (1985)). However, if a firm has well-differentiated products with no rivals in its
product space, then it can earn monopoly profits. Therefore, having overlapping shareholders with
industry peers should not affect price competition.4 In contrast, firms offering similar products
compete on prices to gain market share. The presence of common owners should reduce the
1Two firms are commonly owned when both the firms are (partially) held by one or more common investors.
2The debate on common ownership remains unsettled. Several papers have challenged the findings of these papers.
See Lewellen and Lowry (2019) for a review.
3See Elhauge (2017) and the references therein for a review of the legal implications of this phenomenon.
4Firms in monopolistic competition may alter their behavior due to common owners. They can, for instance,
have fewer incentives to differentiate their product quality and/or features and as a result, might reduce their R&D
expenditure and advertising expenses.
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incentives of these firms to compete on price. That is, if the firms compete in the same product
space, incentives to not compete brought about by the presence of common owners, would be
strong because the firms might potentially gain from tacit collusion. Based on the above argument,
this paper tests the following hypothesis: firms with similar products experience stronger pricing
effects due to common ownership.
When estimating the effects of common ownership on product price reverse causality is a con-
cern. It is possible that common ownership does not drive higher product prices, instead common
ownership is the outcome of investors seeking firms with higher margins and profitability. To
address this concern, I use mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of financial institutions as a quasi-
natural experiment, as outlined in He and Huang (2017). When two financial institutions merge,
the merger affects the common ownership of the firms in their portfolios independent of firm char-
acteristics. I use the portfolio holdings of the merging institutions one quarter prior to the merger
announcement date to first identify treated and control firms and then use difference-in-differences
estimation to test my hypothesis. I also use the mutual fund scandal, that surfaced in 2003, as an
additional test for robustness. In September 2003, 20 mutual funds were implicated in illegal trad-
ing. Kisin (2011) documents that these funds experienced significant outflows, which forced them
to sell their stakes in firms independent of firm characteristics. Therefore, any changes in the level
of common ownership due to the actions of mutual funds involved in the scandal is exogenous to
the firm. I follow Anton and Polk (2014) and use the variation in common ownership due to these
mutual funds to instrument for the level of a firm’s common ownership.
To test whether the effects of common ownership vary by product market characteristics of
a firm, I regress industry-adjusted gross margin on common ownership interacted with product
similarity. I follow Hoberg and Phillips (2016) to define average product similarity (ATSIM) as
the average similarity between a firm and its industry peer. As firms do not report per unit prices
or marginal costs, I use gross margin (measured as sales minus cost of goods sold as a percentage
of sales) as a proxy for price levels. Gross margin captures the ability of a firm to price its products
above the cost of goods sold and is indicative of market power. I find that the relationship between
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gross margin and common ownership is stronger when the products are more similar. Specifically,
a one standard deviation in common ownership increases gross margin by 3.2 percentage points
(pp), but that effect rises by an additional 6.3 pp when product similarity is one standard deviation
above its mean.
One might conjecture that these findings stem from cost reductions. However, in a perfectly
competitive environment a firm should price at marginal cost. The ability of a firm to not pass its
cost reductions on to consumers indicates market power, which is consistent with the argument
that common ownership reduces competition and increases the market power of these firms. To
further rule out the argument that cost reductions drive the gross margin results, I hand-collect
data on the reasons for gross margin changes for 100 firm-years from the MD&A section (Item
7) of annual reports and perform a difference-in-means test of whether firms with higher levels
of common ownership are more likely to mention price increases. I find that, compared to firms
with no common ownership, firms with common ownership are 20% more likely to mention price
increases. Due to the small sample size, the test for common ownership interacted with product
similarity lacks statistical power.5
While price is one way to compete, firms can also compete on product features and quality.
To the extent that common ownership has anti-competitive effects, firms with common owners
should have fewer incentives to innovate. Thus, I hypothesize that firms with similar products and
common ownership reduce research and development (R&D) expenditures. A competing hypoth-
esis is that firms with common owners can invest in process improvements to reduce costs and
further improve margins. I find that firms with similar products reduce their R&D spending by
0.4 percentage points with a one standard deviation increase in common ownership. This result
is consistent with the anti-competitive effects of common ownership. Higher gross margins and
reduced R&D expenditures translate to higher profitability. Firms with similar products earn 4.2 to
10.8 pp higher industry-adjusted EBITDA when the common ownership increases by one standard
deviation. The mean level of common ownership is 13% with a standard deviation of 16% and the
5I am in the process of collecting data for a large sample.
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mean of similarity score is 0.02 with a standard deviation of 0.03.
The results thus far show that the effects of common ownership on pricing depend on the
product market characteristics of a firm. To test whether the above findings indicate that the effects
of common ownership are concentrated in certain industries, I sort my data into quartiles based
on the average product similarity. I find that the anti-competitive effects are not the same across
industries – the effects are present in industries with high average product similarity. Gross margin,
R&D to sales ratio, and EBITDA to sales ratio have no reliable relation with common ownership
for industries with low average product similarity scores.6 This finding suggests that concerns
about, and potentially regulations of, common ownership should focus on some industries more
than others.
This paper adds to the literature on common ownership. With the increasing concentration of
US industries (Grullon, Larkin, and Michaely (2017)), lower investments despite high Tobin’s Q
(Gutiérrez and Philippon (2016)), and the rise of institutional holdings and common ownership
(Gilje, Gormley, and Levit (2017)), questions about the anti-competitive effects of common own-
ership are pertinent. Currently, there is no consensus on the effects of common ownership. Several
papers find that it affects firm policies and decisions. Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) find that in-
vestors which own both acquirer and target are more likely to vote for the merger. He and Huang
(2017) show that commonly owned firms have higher market share growth and cost synergies.
Semov (2017) provides evidence that commonly owned firms hold less cash on hand and move
together in the product space. Panayides and Thomas (2017) find evidence of cost reduction in
manufacturing industries. Freeman (2017) documents that vertical common ownership improves
customer-supplier relationships.
Others are skeptical of the effects of fund investors on the competitive landscape of various
industries.7 In fact, some industry experts claim that the concept lacks economic foundation –
Barbara Novick (co-founder and vice chairman of BlackRock) notes, “These papers lack economic
6I find similar results if I use median score instead of mean score.
7See: O’Brien and Waehrer (2017); https://www.foley.com/horizontal-shareholding-is-oligopoly-pricing-a-
symptom-or-the-disease-03-30-2017/
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logic and factual support from the real world."8 Several other papers have challenged the findings
(see: O’Brien and Waehrer (2017), Gramlich and Grundl (2017), Dennis, Gerardi, and Schenone
(2018)). For instance, Dennis, Gerardi, and Schenone (2018) find that common ownership does not
have any pricing effect in the airlines’ industry once the passenger count is accounted for. Similarly,
Gramlich and Grundl (2017) find mixed evidence of pricing effects in the banking industry.
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, I show that the anti-competitive
effect of common ownership occurs only in industries that have similar products. That the anti-
competitive effects of common ownership accrue to firms that have similar products is an important
finding because it indicates that any policy implications about common ownership should take into
account industry characteristics. To the extent that common ownership reduces competition, pol-
icymakers may consider taking steps to curb the anti-competitive effects of common ownership.
Curtailing ownership across multiple firms in an industry with a high level of product similarity
might not eliminate portfolio diversification benefits for an investor because demand across such
firms would be positively correlated. On the other hand, allowing investors to invest in multiple
firms in industries with lower product similarity would allow them to reap the benefits of diversifi-
cation without affecting the market power of the firm.
Second, I develop measures of common ownership that are firm-specific and take into account
not only blockholders (investors that hold with 5% or higher shares outstanding) but also owners
that have a substantial monetary stake in a firm.9 For instance, in June 2011, none of the top ten
investors in Microsoft were blockholders, but collectively they held 22% of its market cap, and
the holding of the smallest investor of the top ten was $2 billion. My results suggest that when
constructing measures of common ownership, it may be important to look beyond strictly defined
blockholders. If non-blockholders with large monetary stakes are important, focusing strictly on
blockholders underestimates the level of common ownership for large firms. Compared to my
definition, using only blockholders underestimates the level of common ownership firms have. For
instance, based solely on blockholders, 42% of firms in the Compustat universe are commonly
8https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-index-funds-democratize-investing-1483914571
9Section 2.2.2 details how I calculate substantial monetary stake.
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owned. This number increases to 70% when one includes not only blockholders but also investors
that may not have a large equity percentage stake but has a substantial monetary stake in the firm.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This section describes the data – the sample construction process, variable definitions, and the
summary statistics.
2.2.1 Sample Construction
I start with all publicly listed firms with positive assets, non-negative sales, and non-missing
industry classification (4-digit SIC code and FIC400 code).10 I drop firms that have missing stock
price data on CRSP, and have no product similarity score in the Hoberg and Phillips data library.11
I exclude industries with less than two firms, financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utility firms
(SIC 4900-4999). The final sample has 59,987 firm-years. The sample period covers 1997–2015
because the product similarity data is available from 1997 to 2015.
2.2.2 Variable Definitions
Appendix A.1 contains detailed definition of all the variables used in this paper.
Dependent Variable
The primary variable of interest is the industry-adjusted gross margin (Ind. Adj. Gross Margin).
Gross margin is sales minus cost of goods sold divided by sales. It captures the ability of a firm
to price its good above cost of goods sold. I also study firms’ R&D expenditure as a percentage
of total sales to test if common ownership has differential effect on firms’ innovation spending. I
replace missing R&D expenditure with zero. To test whether common ownership impacts firms’
profitability, I use the EBITDA to sales ratio and net income to sales ratio as dependent variables.
All dependent variables are adjusted for the industry average, where the industry is defined alter-
nately using the 4-digit SIC code (SIC) or the FIC400 (FIC).
10FIC stands for fixed industry classification. This classification was developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010) and
Hoberg and Phillips (2016). The data is available on their website http://hobergphillips.usc.edu/industryclass.htm
11Product similarity data is available at http://hobergphillips.usc.edu/
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Calculating Common Ownership
A firm is commonly owned if its shareholders hold one or more of its industry peers. I use
Thomson Reuters’ (13-F) database to identify such shareholders. All financial institutions that
manage $100 million or more have to report their holdings to the SEC using form 13-F. To calcu-
late the level of common ownership at a given firm, it is important to identify which institutional
investors should be classified as common owners. The empirical literature has either focused on
blockholders (shareholders who own 5% or more common shares outstanding) or used an arbitrary
percentage cutoff. While it is important that these investors hold substantial equity in the firm,
the dollar value of the investment is also relevant as it is hard for an investor to be a blockholder
in large firms. Focusing solely on equity stake ignores economically meaningful stakes in larger
firms. For example, using only blockholders ignores common ownership links among large firms
such as Apple Inc. Apple has only one blockholder in the third-quarter of 2010 but 325 investors
with an average of $477.66 million (median of $129.66 million) per investor invested in the firm.12
As a result, any measure of common ownership that relies solely on blockholders underestimates
the level of common ownership in an industry.
Therefore, I use the following approach. For each quarter, I keep investors that either own
5% or more in the firm or that have substantial dollar amount invested in the firm. A holding is
considered substantial if the dollar value of the holding is higher than the median dollar holding
of a blockholder in any firm. For instance, in the third quarter of 2009, the median holding of
a blockholder across all firms was $31 million. Therefore, for constructing common ownership
measure as of September 2009, I consider all investors that were either blockholders or whose
holdings were greater than $31 million. An investor is classified as a common owner if it owns
at least one other firm in the same industry.13 Using these institutional investors, I create three
measures of common ownership.14
12The average and the median amount reported for Apple’s investors excludes its sole blockholder.
13My results are similar if I use blockholders only. However, as mentioned earlier, using blockholders neglect
economically meaningful holdings especially in large firms.
14Many empirical papers use the Modified Herfindahl Index Delta (MHHID) to capture common ownership. MH-
HID is an industry level measure that aggregates each firm’s incentives to internalize the externalities it imposes on its
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The first measure, ComOwn, is the total percentage of shares held by investors in a firm who
own at least one industry-peer. I first calculate the percentage of shares held in each quarter, and
then average over the fiscal year to get a firm-year measure. ComOwn captures the degree to which
the firm is commonly owned. The second measure, PropPeer, is the proportion of industry-peers. I
first identify the total number of unique industry peers a firm is connected to via common owners in
each quarter. I then average it over the fiscal year to get an annual number. PropPeer is the number
of unique industry peers a firm is connected to in a year divided by the total firms, excluding the
firm itself, in that industry-year. Note that number of firms in an industry is available annually.
Therefore, averaging the number of firms and then calculating the ratio is equivalent to averaging
the ratio. For example, suppose an industry has ten firms and firm i is connected to three other
firms in that industry. PropPeer is 3 divided by 9 (=10-1) i.e. 1/3. This measure captures how
connected a firm is in a given industry. The third measure, NumMgnr, is the number of common
owners a firm has in a given fiscal year. I first calculate the number of common owners a firm
has in a quarter and then average it over the fiscal year to get a firm-year measure. This measure
is analogous to He and Huang (2017)’s NumCross variable. An institutional investor is classified
as a common owner if it owns at least one other firm in the same industry. For a given firm, this
measure captures how many investors are invested in the firm as well as its industry peers. The
more common owners a firm has, the more likely it is that its interests are aligned with industry
peers.
Measuring Product Similarity
I use Hoberg and Phillips (2016)’s total similarity score to capture the extent to which a firm’s
product offerings are similar to its industry-peers. Average total similarity (ATSIM) measures how
similar a firm’s product description is relative to other firms. Specifically, for a given firm i, words
in its business description, as reported in its annual report, is represented using a vector, Vi. In a
industry peers. I do not use MHHID as I want to measure common ownership at the firm-level. Moreover, MHHID
uses market share as weight. My main variable of interest is gross margin. Because price levels affect market share,
using MHHID would make it hard to disentangle whether the variation in market share or the variation in holdings is
driving my results.
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given fiscal year, pairwise product similarity between firm i and j is one minus the cosine distance
of the Vi and Vj . This pairwise measure is aggregated to get an annual firm-level measure of
product similarity. There are two ways to aggregate the measure – average over all the firms in the
sample (ATSIM) or average over all the firms in a given industry, where industry is defined using
either 4-digit SIC code (ATSIM-SIC) or FIC400 code (ATSIM-FIC). I test my hypotheses using
both and find consistent results.
Control Variables
I control for the firm’s size (natural log of total assets), its growth opportunities (market to
book ratio), cash to asset ratio, how much it spends on advertising and R&D as a percentage of
assets, and its leverage ratio (long term debt to total assets ratio). I also control for percentage of
shares held by all institutional investors to control for any effect institutional investors might have
on a firm’s gross margin and profitability. I control for industry concentration using Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) and number of firms in the industry. All control variables are measured at
t-1.
2.2.3 Summary Statistics
Table C.1 gives the summary statistics. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the de-
pendent as well as the key independent variables. Average industry-adjusted gross margin is 6%
(4%), average industry-adjusted R&D to sales ratio is -10% (-7%) and average industry-adjusted
EBITDA to sales ratio is 13% (10%), where industry is defined using 4-digit SIC code (FIC400).
Average total similarity is 2%. 13% of a firm’s shares are held by investors that hold at least one
industry peer (ComOwn). On average a firm is connected to 21% of its industry-peers (PropPeer)15
and have an average of five common owners (NumMgnr).
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for firm characteristics. Average firm size is $2.82
billion. The average firm has a market to book ratio of 2. The mean cash to assets ratio is 21%
and leverage ratio is 17%. In a typical firm, 42% of shares are held by all institutional investors
15The mean market share held by the peers is 52% (40% per common owner).
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compared to 14% of shares held by blockholders. The average industry concentration (HHI) is
2700, which according to the FTC’s definition is high. The average number of firms in an industry
is around 50. 68% of the firms have at least one common owner.
2.3 Results
This section describes the empirical design and presents the panel regression results. In section
2.4, I use two quasi-natural experiments to establish causality.
2.3.1 Evidence of price increase
To test if the pricing effects of common ownership vary based on product market characteris-
tics, I estimate the following regression equation:
Yit = β1CommonOwnershipt−1 + β2ATSIMt−1 + β3CommonOwnershipt−1 x ATSIMt−1
+γ′Xt−1 + αi + ηt + eit
(2.1)
where Y is alternatively measured as industry-adjusted gross margin, industry-adjusted R&D
to sales ratio, industry-adjusted EBITDA to sales ratio, and net income to sales ratio. Common
ownership is one of the three measures discussed in section 2.2.2, ATSIM is the measure of average
product similarity defined in section 2.2.2, X includes firm-level controls defined in appendix A.1,
αi are firm fixed effects, and ηt are year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firms.
To make it easier to interpret the results, coefficients on common ownership and the similarity
measures are standardized (with mean zero and variance one) in the tables. The coefficient of
interest is β3, the coefficient on the interaction term between common ownership and ATSIM. It
measures the extent to which common ownership has a differential effect on a firm’s price levels
based on its product similarity.
Table C.2 presents the results of the panel regressions. I first test the main dependent variable,
industry-adjusted gross margin, where the industry is defined using 4-digit SIC code in Panel A
and FIC400 in Panel B. Columns (1)-(3) use the average product similarity aggregated over all
firms (ATSIM) whereas columns (4)-(6) use average product similarity aggregated over the spe-
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cific industry (ATSIM-SIC or ATSIM-FIC). The interaction coefficient is positive and statistically
significant, i.e., the effects of common ownership are stronger when a firm has higher product sim-
ilarity. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in common ownership increases the gross
margin by 3 percentage points. However, the effect is stronger for firms with similar products.
Firms with product similarity one standard deviation mean have an additional 2.8 to 12.3 percent-
age point higher gross margin. An increase in product similarity should lower a firm’s ability to
charge higher margins, i.e., firms with a high level of product similarity should have lower pricing
power. However, the coefficient on the interaction term suggests that the anti-competitive effects
of common ownership are stronger for firms with similar products.
One possible concern is that the higher gross margin is caused by reasons other than price
increases. For instance, it is possible that the unit selling price and volume were constant, but the
firm reduced costs. That is, the firm improved its margin because it lowered its cost per unit due
to efficiency improvements. Note first that, in a competitive market, firms should pass any cost
savings to consumers. A reduction in cost without a simultaneous decrease in price, therefore,
indicates pricing power and stronger anti-competitive effects of common ownership for firms with
homogeneous products.
To further rule out the argument that the higher gross margin could be due to cost reductions or
economies of scale and not price increases, I hand-collected data on drivers of gross margin from
Item 7 in firms’ annual reports (form 10-K). Item 7 is the management discussion and analysis
(MD&A) section where management discusses current results, outlines future expectations, and
describes the key drivers for the firm’s growth or the lack of it. To capture whether firms with
higher common ownership are more likely to mention price increases than other firms, I randomly
selected 100 firms in fiscal year 2005. The choice of the year was random and reflects a mid-point
in my sample. For these firms, I analyzed the MD&A section and tabulated whether it mentioned
price increases. For instance, the following is an excerpt from Celgene Corporation’s 2005 annual
report: “net sales were higher in 2005, as compared to 2004, primarily due to price increases
implemented as we move towards a cost of therapy pricing structure as opposed to a price per
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milligram." Using a difference in means test, I find that firms with common ownership are 20%
more likely to mention a selling price increase in Item 7.16
2.3.2 Effect on R&D expenditure
Given the results in Section 2.3.1 that the anti-competitive effects of common ownership vary
depending on the product market characteristics of the firms, I test whether common owners also
affect other product market competition related firm policies. Specifically, I focus on R&D expen-
diture because innovation (product or process) is one of the key determinants of a firm’s competi-
tiveness. I test whether common ownership affects firms incentives to engage in R&D.17
The relationship between competition and innovation is not linear. Aghion, Bloom, Blundell,
Griffith, and Howitt (2005) find that competition and innovation has an inverted-U shape relation-
ship. A priori it is unclear whether a firm with homogeneous products and common ownership
should increase its R&D expenditure or not. A firm can innovate to improve its product design or
reduce its process costs. To the extent that an increase in common ownership reduces incentives to
compete, firms with similar products would have fewer incentives to differentiate their products.
On the other hand, firms might increase investments in R&D to improve their processes and reduce
production costs, thereby improving their margins further. Given the two competing hypothesis,
with an increase in common ownership, whether firms with homogeneous products invest more or
less in R&D is an empirical question. Moreover, extant literature has documented mixed effects of
common ownership on R&D expenditure. He and Huang (2017) find that common ownership in-
creases innovation, Borochin, Yang, and Zhang (2018) find that R&D expenditures vary depending
on the type of common owners.
To test this, I regress industry-adjusted R&D to sales ratio on common ownership, product
16Due to small sample size my tests are statistically insignificant for the interaction term. I am in the process of
collecting more data.
17I also test firms’ capacity (capital expenditure ratio) and spending on product differentiation (advertising expendi-
ture ratio). In unreported results, I find that the coefficient on the interaction term for common ownership and product
similarity is insignificant for capital expenditure ratio. To the extent that capital expenditure is a noisy proxy for the
firm’s capacity, this is not surprising. Consistent with the hypothesis that common ownership effects are stronger
for firms with similar products, I find that the interaction coefficient of common ownership and product similarity is
negative for advertising expenditure ratio. However, the coefficient is not always statistically significant.
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similarity, their interaction, and firm level controls. Table C.3 presents the results. While the
industry-adjusted R&D ratio has a mean of zero, for a one standard deviation increase in common
ownership, firms with similar products reduce their R&D spending by 0.3-0.7 percentage point.
The results are consistent if I scale R&D by assets instead of sales. This result suggests that, with
an increase in common ownership, firms with high product similarity choose to reduce their R&D
expenditure because they have fewer incentives to differentiate their product offerings. Common
ownership leads to reduced competition because the firms’ internalize the externalities they impose
on their rivals and aim to seek higher industry profits. In this context, for firms with similar
products, differentiating their products from its peers would be contrary to the objective function.18
2.3.3 Effect on profitability
I have shown that the anti-competitive effects of common ownership are stronger for firms
with similar products. However, does the increased gross margin and reduced R&D expenditure
translates into improved profit margins? It is plausible that the higher gross margin and reduced
R&D expenditure does not yield any differential effect on a firm’s bottom line compared to firms
with differentiated products. To test this, I estimate equation 2.1 with the EBITDA to sales ratio
and net income to sales ratio as the dependent variable. Tables C.4 and C.5 presents the results
for EBITDA/SALE and NI/SALE, respectively. I find that firms with similar products have, on
average, 4.2 to 21.5 percentage point higher EBITDA to sales ratio with a one standard deviation
increase in common ownership.
2.4 Establishing Causality
The panel regression results do not rule out endogeneity issues, especially the concern that
investment in a firm is an endogenous choice. Investors choose firms based on specific characteris-
tics, and it is plausible that the level of common ownership does not drive the results documented
18A firm’s R&D is positively related to its value, i.e., R&D is positively related to Tobin’s Q. If with an increase
in common ownership firms with similar products are reducing R&D and the effect is harmful to the firm’s value, I
should observe negative Tobin’s Q for these firms. However, in unreported results, I find that Tobin Q of firms with
high product similarity is not negatively affected by an increase in common ownership, i.e., the interaction coefficient
is not significant. The result suggests that the investors do not view the reduction in R&D expenditure as harmful.
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so far. Instead, it could be that institutional investors selected into firms with higher gross margins
and profitability. To rule out reverse causality and alleviate endogenous selection concerns, I rely
on two quasi-natural experiments. The first is the M&As of financial institutions and the second
is the mutual fund scandal of 2003. As explained below, these quasi-natural experiments caused
changes in firms’ common ownership orthogonal to their characteristics.
2.4.1 Mergers of Financial Institutions
I use mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of financial institutions as an exogenous shock to the
common ownership levels of firms. Two financial institutions merge for a variety of reasons – to re-
duce costs and improve performance by eliminating redundancies (Houston, James, and Ryngaert
(2001)), to increase market power and gain economies of scale (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan
(1999)), consolidation of the financial industry, or regulatory changes. To the extent that factors
orthogonal to the product market characteristics of the portfolio firms drive M&As between finan-
cial institutions, any changes in the common ownership of the portfolio firms as a result of the
merger would be exogenous to firms’ characteristics.19
Specifically, I follow He and Huang (2017) to identify exogenous variation in a firm’s common
ownership levels due to M&As between financial institutions and test if this variation drives the
outcome variables. In order to do this, I first identify mergers that were between two financial
institutions, i.e., SIC code for acquirer and target was between 6000-6999, announced between
2001 and 2008, and were completed within one year of announcement. There were ten such
acquisitions between 2001 and 2008.20 Appendix B.1 contains the list of acquisitions. For these
ten M&As, I get the portfolio holdings data for the target and acquirer using Thomson Reuters’ 13-
F database. I then identify firms where these institutions were either blockholders or had substantial
dollar holdings (see 2.2.2 for additional details on how common owners are identified).
I classify the portfolio firms as either treated or control. Firms are treated if they were in the
19See He and Huang (2017) for additional discussion on how considerations other than their portfolio holdings drive
M&A between two financial institutions.
20To create a seven-year window around mergers, I need my data to start in 1997, and therefore the earliest acquisi-
tion that I can use is that in 2001.
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portfolio of either party and experienced an increase in common ownership. Firms are controls if
they were in the portfolio of either party and did not experience an increase in common ownership.
More precisely, in the quarter prior to the announcement date, if firm i is in acquirer’s (target’s)
portfolio and the target (acquirer) holds another firm in the same industry, then firm i is classified
as treated. Similarly, if firm j is in acquirer’s (target’s) portfolio and the target (acquirer) does not
hold any firm in the same industry, then firm j is classified as a control firm. By choosing firms
from the same set of financial institutions, this design controls for investment styles. I drop firms
that were in both the acquirer and the target portfolios because these firms cannot be classified as
treated or control. For instance, if firm i is held by both acquirer and target it cannot experience
an increase in common ownership due to another firm in the same industry because it is already
connected to it either via acquirer or target.
To capture the effect of M&As on common ownership, I follow He and Huang (2017) and
define the dependent variable in two ways. The first measure is CODummy which takes the value
of 1 if the firm is held by either party that also holds another firm in the same industry in the quarter
prior to date of announcement for the pre-period, i.e., post = 0 and in the quarter immediately after
deal completion for the post period, i.e., post = 1. The second measure is LnNumPeers which is
natural log of one plus the number of same industry peers a firm is connected to. These variables
are different from the ones used in the panel regressions because this experiment would not affect
ComOwn and NumMgnr. For instance, say firm i is held by the acquirer and firm j is held by the
target. Firm i experiences an increase in common ownership because post acquisition it is now
connected to its same industry peer j. However, its ComOwn and NumMgnr measures does not
change. The only measure that would change is PropPeer. Therefore, I use LnNumPeers. Note
that I have deal x firm fixed effects. Therefore, scaling by the number of firms does not change
my results. Moreover, the change in common ownership is unidirectional because a firm either
experiences an increase in the number of industry peers its connected to or it does not experience
any change in its common ownership levels.
Using difference-in-differences estimation, I first test whether the M&As result in changes in
18
common ownership levels for treated firm vis-à-vis control firms. I estimate the following equation:
Yit = β1Post + β2Treated + β3Post x Treated + γ′Xt−p + αij + ηt + eijt (2.2)
where, Yit is either a CODummy (=1 if the firm is commonly owned, 0 otherwise) or LnNumPeers
(natural log of the number of peers connected to a firm). Treated = 1 if the firm experienced
an increase in common ownership due to the M&As, 0 otherwise. Post = 1 for the years post
acquisition. Following He and Huang (2017), the control variables are lagged at t-p, where p = 4
for the pre-period and p = 0 for the post-period. The coefficient of interest is β3, which captures the
differential effect of common ownership based on the product market characteristics of the firm.
Table C.6 Panel A presents the results. β3 is statistically significant in all columns. The co-
efficient of 0.088 in column 1 implies that acquisitions between financial institutions increase the
likelihood that a firm in the institution’s portfolio is commonly held by 8.8%.
Next, I test if the effect of common ownership on gross margin varies by the product similarity
for the treated firms. To test this, I estimate the following multivariate difference-in-differences
specification:
Yit = β1Post + β2Treated + β3ATSIM + β4Post x Treated + β5Post xATSIM
+β6Treated x ATSIM + β7Post x Treated x ATSIM + γ′Xt−p + αij + ηt + eijt
(2.3)
where beta7 is the coefficient of interest, X includes all the control variables used in the panel
regressions, αij are either deal x firm fixed effects or deal and firm fixed effects, and ηt are year
fixed effects. The sample period is three years around the acquisition. Post = 1 during the three
years post-merger, 0 during the three years pre-merger. The year of acquisition is omitted from the
analysis.
Table C.6 Panel B presents the results for industry-adjusted gross margin. Compared to control
firms, treated firms experience an increase of 3.1 to 8.2 percentage point. That is, with an increase
in common ownership levels, treated firms have a higher gross margin than control firms. Panel C
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and D reports the results for R&D to sales ratio and EBITDA to sales ratio, respectively. Consistent
with panel regression results, I find that the effects of common ownership are more pronounced in
firms with similar products.
2.4.2 Mutual Fund Scandal
In 2003, twenty mutual fund families were implicated in illegal trading and eventually negoti-
ated settlement (Zitzewitz (2009)). Appendix B.2 contains the names of these mutual fund families.
Kisin (2011) documents that these funds experienced significant outflows from 2004-2006. As in-
vestors withdrew money, the funds were forced to sell their positions. Anton and Polk (2014) use
the ratio of total value held by these institutional investors and the total value held by all institu-
tional investors as of September 2003 to instrument for the level of common ownership in the years
following the scandal. In the spirit of their paper, I instrument ComOwn with ScandalComOwn,
the ratio of percentage of shares held by common mutual funds that were affected by the scandal
and the percentage of shares held by all common owners. This instrument satisfies the exclusion
restriction as Anton and Polk (2014) noted that the substantial outflows from these mutual funds
forced them to sell their stakes in firms independent of firm characteristics. Therefore, any change
caused in the level of common ownership due to the actions of scandal mutual funds is exogenous
to the firm.
I use ScandalComOwn to instrument for ComOwn and use two-stage least squares (2SLS)
regression analysis to estimate the effect of common ownership and product similarity on the firm’s
gross margin, R&D to sales ratio, EBITDA to sales ratio, and net income to sales ratio. The
sample period is 2004-2006, i.e., the sample is limited to the years the affected funds experienced
significant outflows. ScandalComOwn is calculated at the end of September 2003 and is used
to instrument ComOwn from 2004-2006. Because my coefficient of interest is the interaction of
common ownership (ComOwn) and product similarity (ATSIM), I run two first stage regressions
– one for common ownership and the other for common ownership interacted with similarity score
(Wooldridge (2010)). The regression includes all the control variables used in the panel estimation
and year fixed effect. Since the instrument is invariable for a given firm, I cannot use firm fixed
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effects in 2SLS estimation.
Table C.7 reports the results. Panel A presents the first stage regressions for ComOwn and
ComOwn x ATSIM and the second stage results for the effect of common ownership and prod-
uct similarity on gross margin. The instrument satisfies the relevance criteria – the coefficient on
the instrument is significant. Specifically, in Table C.7 Panel A (columns 1 and 2), Sanderson-
Windmeijer F-statistic for weak identification (Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016)) is 85 and 47 for
the two first-stage regressions, respectively. Moreover, the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic (Kleibergen
and Paap (2006)) is 46.27 indicating that the instrument is not weak. The coefficient on Scandal-
ComOwn in the first stage is negative, i.e., the outflow caused common ownership at the firms
to decrease. Consistent with the panel regression results, I find that with one standard deviation
increase in common ownership, firms with similar products have higher gross margin.
Panel B presents the results for R&D to sales ratio, EBITDA to sales ratio and net income to
sales ratio. With a one standard deviation increase in common ownership, firms with homogeneous
products have 2.2 to 4 percentage points lower R&D expenditure. Similarly, firms with similar
products have higher profit margins with a one standard deviation increase in common ownership.
That is, the effects of common ownership is stronger for firms with similar products than firms
with differentiated products.
2.5 Does common ownership affect certain industries more?
The results thus far show that the effects of common ownership vary based on the product
market characteristics of the firm. This finding raises the question whether the effects of common
ownership are present across all industries or does common ownership affect some industries more
than others? To test whether the anti-competitive effects of common ownership are concentrated
in certain industries, I do the following. Each year I assign a similarity score equal to the average
similarity scores of all the firms in that industry-year to the industry, and then sort the data into
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similarity quartiles.21 I estimate the following regression specification:
Yit = β1COSimilarityQuartilei1,t−1 + β2COSimilarityQuartilei2,t−1
+β3COSimilarityQuartilei3,t−1 + β4COSimilarityQuartilei4,t−1
+δTSIMit−1 + γ
′Xit−1 + αi + ηt + eit
(2.4)
where, Y is alternatively measured as gross margin, R&D to sales ratio, EBITDA to sales ratio, and
net income to sales ratio. All dependent variables are industry-adjusted, where industry is defined
either using 4-digit SIC code or FIC400 code. CO Similarity Quartileij measures firm-level com-
mon ownership for firm i in quartile j and is 0 otherwise, ATSIM controls for the similarity score
of the firm, X includes all other firm-level control variables used in the panel regressions (see:
appendix A.1 for variable definitions), αi are firm fixed effects, and ηt are year fixed effects. As
before, to make it easier to interpret the coefficients, common ownership measures are standardized
(with mean zero and variance one) in the tables. The coefficients of interest are β1, β2, β3, and β4.
For each industry quartile j, βj captures the effect of common ownership on the industry-adjusted
dependent variable.
As an example of how common ownership can matter in certain industries and not in others,
consider the following. Dana Inc and Tenneco Inc both belong to SIC code 3714 (motor vehicle
parts and accessories). In the second quarter of 2011, out of the top 10 institutional investors in
these firms, four investors (Blackrock, Fidelity, State Street, and Vanguard) held shares in both the
firms: 16.5% in Dana and 23.5% in Tenneco. However, the product similarity of these two firms
is low. May be not surprisingly, this industry belongs to the lowest quartile, i.e., firms in it have
the least similar products. In contrast, Microsoft and Oracle belong to SIC code 7372, which falls
in the highest quartile of product similarity. In quarter two of 2011, these firms had seven com-
mon owners (Amvescap, Blackrock, Capital Research Global Investors, Capital World Investors,
Mellon Bank, State Street, and Vanguard) out of top ten investors and they held 18.7% and 16.9%
shares in Microsoft and Oracle, respectively. In recent years, Oracle seems to have been competing
21The results are similar if I use the median product similarity score instead of the mean.
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more with Amazon’s Web Services than with Microsoft, one of its main competitors.22 In fact, in
2013, Oracle entered into a partnership with Microsoft.23 Should the presence of common owners
have similar effects on both of these firm pairs or should the effect be stronger for the latter pair
of firms? I hypothesize that the presence of common owners should have a stronger effect on the
latter pair of firms.
Table C.8 presents the results. Similarity quartile j is equal to ComOwn in columns 1 and 4,
peerProp in columns 2 and 5, and NumMgnr in columns 3 and 6. For each firm, the variable takes
the value of the common ownership measure if the firm belongs to an industry in the jth similarity
quartile, else it is equal to 0. To conserve space, I do not report the coefficients on the control
variables. Panel A presents the results for industry-adjusted gross margin. The results show that
the pricing effects of common ownership are concentrated in firms that belong to industries in
the 4th similarity quartile, i.e., the effects are concentrated in industries that have high similarity
scores. For firms in industries with high similarity scores, a one standard deviation increase in
common ownership increases the price levels by 1.2 to 3.7 percentage points whereas the effect is
largely insignificant for other similarity quartiles. The difference in the coefficient for the highest
similarity quartile and the lowest similarity quartile is statistically significant at 1%.
Table C.8 Panel B presents the results for R&D to sales ratio. The results are qualitatively
similar if I scale R&D by assets instead. The effects of common ownership are limited to firms
belonging to industries where the average similarity scores are high. With one standard deviation
increase in common ownership, firms that belong to industries with highest level of similarity score
have 0.7-1.6 percentage point lower R&D expenditure. Increase in common ownership does not
have similar effect for firms in other industries. The statistical significance of the coefficients for
quartiles 2 and 3 vary depending on the measure of common ownership and industry. Finally, Panel
C and D of Table C.8 report the results for EBITDA to sales ratio and net income to sales ratio,





The OLS results do not rule out the concern that investors are choosing these firms because
they are profitable. To rule out this concern, I repeat the analysis for firms that experienced an
exogenous change in their common ownership levels due to mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
of financial institutions. The experiment is identical to the setup outlined in 2.4.1.24 Table C.9
presents the results. Industry is defined using 4-digit SIC in Panel A and FIC400 code in Panel B.
The coefficients on the triple interaction terms capture how the effect of common ownership vary
between treated and control firms post treatment across firms that belong to industries in different
similarity quartiles. SimQuartileDummyij is equal to 1 for firm i that is in industry quartile j,
zero otherwise. Treated = 1 if the firm experienced an increase in common ownership due to the
merger, 0 otherwise. Post = 1 for the post-acquisition period, 0 otherwise. The lowest quartile
is the baseline and hence, omitted. While the results are similar (and sometimes stronger) with
deal and firm fixed effect, I only report the most stringent specification where I include deal x firm
fixed effects. Similar to the OLS regressions, the effect of common ownership is present only in
industries with a high similarity score (quartile 4).
Taken together, the results in tables C.8 and C.9 show that the anti-competitive effects of com-
mon ownership are limited to industries with homogeneous products. This result has policy impli-
cations – if the level of common ownership does not matter for firms that are in certain industries,
then any policy changes to curtail the harmful effect of common ownership must take into account
the product market characteristics of the firms.
2.6 Robustness Tests
I perform several additional tests. I use GDP price index as a proxy for price levels and test if
the pricing effects of common ownership vary based on the product similarity. I also rule out the
possibility that my results are driven by transient or short term investors.
24The 2SLS estimation results in weak instrument problem. Since weak instrument can exacerbate the bias in the
estimated coefficients, I only present the results from the M&A quasi-natural experiment here.
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2.6.1 Evidence of price increase
To further test if the pricing effects of common ownership vary based on the product market
characteristics, I use the price index for manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries used
in Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)’s national income and product accounts (NIPA). BEA
produces the chain-weighted GDP price index to measure changes in the price paid for goods and
services.25 The data captures year-on-year changes in prices at an industry level. Because my
analysis is at a firm level, I merge the industry data to all the firms in a given industry. Given that
my dependent variable does not change across firms in an industry, I cluster my standard errors by
industry. I acknowledge that the mapping of industry-level variable to firm-level observation is not
ideal as it could result in noisy estimates. However, noisy estimates would increase standard errors
and would bias against finding any results.
While I get qualitatively similar results using OLS, I report the results for the quasi-natural
experiment where two financial institutions merge. Table C.10 reports the result. The dependent
variable is the natural log of the price index. The coefficient of interest is the coefficient on the
triple interaction term Treated x Post x Similarity Quartile j. Again, for each industry quartile j,
βj captures the effect of common ownership on the industry-adjusted dependent variable. Akin to
gross margin results, the pricing effects of common ownership are limited to firms in industries
with the highest similarity quartile. For firms belonging to industries in the highest similarity
quartile, an exogenous increase in common ownership leads to 7.2%–8.5% price increase. This
result reiterates that the pricing effects of common ownership are contingent on the product market
features.
2.6.2 Which investors are driving the results?
The results documented so far do not differentiate between the types of investors. The incen-
tives of institutional investors vary depending on their investment horizon (see: Chen, Harford,
and Li (2007) and the references therein). If firms are internalizing the externalities they impose
25The data is available here: https://www.bea.gov/industry/
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on their industry peers, their incentives should be driven by long term investors. The presence
of short-term investors or transient investors should not drive the results. To test this, I follow
Bushee (1998) and Bushee (2001) and classify investors into three categories based on their port-
folio turnover – dedicated, quasi-indexers, and transient.26 Dedicated investors and quasi-indexers
are long-term investors with the difference that the latter is diversified. Transient investors are
short-term investors.27
Since common owners are expected to hold multiple firms in the same industry, I re-run my
analysis using dedicated and quasi-indexers that are common owners as defined in Section 2.2.2.
Specifically, I repeat the analysis using the setup outlined in Section 2.5 and equation 2.4. While
the results are consistent across different measures of common ownership, to conserve space, I
report results for ComOwn. Moreover, limiting the sample to mutual fund families that were either
dedicated or quasi-indexer investors reduces the number of firms affected by the exogenous shock
considerably. As a result, the exogenous tests do not have enough statistical power and therefore,
I only report the OLS regression results.
Table C.11 reports the results. The effects are similar to those reported in the main results.
The anti-competitive effects of common ownership are insignificant for firms in the lower quartile
of product similarity. However, firms in the highest quartile of product similarity have 1.7 to 2.3
percentage points higher gross margin when the common ownership increases by one standard
deviation. Moreover, firms in the highest quartile of prodcut similarity have lower R&D to sales
ratio, higher EBITDA to sales ratio, and higher net income to sales ratio. The results in this
section provides support to the hypothesis that the results are driven by long-term investors and not
transient or other institutions.
2.7 Conclusion
I find that the anti-competitive effects of common ownership vary based on the product market
characteristics of the firm. A one standard deviation increase in common ownership raises a firm’s
26The data is available at http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html
27Some mutual fund families can mimic behavior of all three. Such mutual funds are unclassified and excluded
from the analysis.
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gross margin by an average of three percentage points, but the effect is three times larger for firms
with product market similarity that is one standard deviation above mean. With an increase in
common ownership, the firms with homogeneous products choose to invest less in R&D consistent
with the hypothesis that they have fewer incentives to innovate. These firms experience higher
profitability. I use two quasi-natural experiments to exogenously vary a firm’s common ownership
levels and establish causality. Further, I find that the anti-competitive effects of common owner-
ship are present only in industries with similar products. The positive relation between common
ownership and gross margin holds only for the industries in the top quartile of product similar-
ity. The findings in this paper inform the debate on common ownership by showing that common
ownership worsens competition only when firms operate in relatively similar product spaces.
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3. COMPETING AGAINST OVERCONFIDENT CEOS
3.1 Introduction
The role of managerial traits, in particular overconfidence, in determining corporate policies
and performance has been widely studied in finance.1 Many prior studies find evidence that over-
confident CEOs make suboptimal decisions about corporate polices, such as financing, invest-
ments, and financial reporting. For instance, overconfident CEOs exhibit heightened investment-
cash flow sensitivity (Malmendier and Tate (2005)), engage in value-destroying acquisitions (Mal-
mendier and Tate (2008)), and use external finance sub-optimally (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan
(2011)). Overconfident CEOs are also associated with poorer quality financial reporting, corporate
fraud, and litigation (e.g., Schrand and Zechman (2012); Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, Nanda, and
Tham (2018)). Bank CEO overconfidence predicts weaker lending standards and excess leverage,
resulting in greater loan defaults and worse performance (Ho, Huang, Lin, and Yen (2016)).
Despite the potential negative effects of overconfidence, many companies employ CEOs who
exhibit overconfidence. A small, but growing number of studies attempt to explain this phe-
nomenon. Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) and Galasso and Simcoe (2011) find that firms
with overconfident CEOs are better innovators. The benefit of such CEOs, however, seems to
be limited to industries in which patents are critical for value creation (Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh
(2012)). Phua, Tham, and Wei (2018) find that overconfident CEOs are better leaders as evidenced
by stronger commitments by suppliers and employees. Another explanation is that overconfident
CEOs are matched with growth firms through the selection process (Graham, Harvey, and Puri
(2013)). Goel and Thakor (2008) and Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley
1Many researchers in finance use the terms overconfidence and overoptimism interchangeably. Others differentiate
between the two by using overoptimism to refer to overestimation of a distribution’s mean, and overconfidence to refer
to underestimation of its variance. The empirical measure that we employ is from Malmendier and Tate (2005) and
Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley (2011), and was developed to capture biased expectations
about the mean return on a firm’s stock or investments. It should also capture biased estimates of the means of firm
inputs like managerial ability, a firm’s ability to compete, the payoffs to aggressive strategies, etc. because these are
positively related to stock returns. We use the term overconfidence throughout the paper to indicate such effects.
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(2011) develop theoretical models in which an overconfidence bias2 offsets a CEO’s risk aversion,
thereby leading to investment choices closer to those preferred by well-diversified shareholders.
Both models feature an interior optimum level of bias. Consistent with the proposition that some
bias is beneficial, Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley (2011) find empirically
that moderately overconfident CEOs are significantly less likely to face forced turnovers than are
CEOs with very low or very high levels of confidence bias.
We contribute to this literature by examining another potential benefit of CEO overconfidence.
We hypothesize and test whether overconfident CEOs respond differently and perform better in
the face of increased competition. We build on prior studies from the economics literature that
find that overconfident agents tend to be more competitive. Camerer and Lovallo (1999)’s experi-
ments show that people’s overconfidence about their skills explains entry into competitive games.
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that differences in overconfidence explain why men are more
likely to embrace competition than women are. This behavior is consistent with Reuben, Wiswall,
and Zafar (2017)’s finding that overconfident agents (proxied as male) choose more competitive
compensation schemes, and that overconfidence and competitiveness are associated with higher
expectations of future earnings. Just, Cao, and Zilberman (2009) show that overconfident, risk-
averse players can dominate rational, risk-averse players in a competitive market because they
invest and produce more.
Our identification strategy relies on exogenous shocks to firms’ competitive environments
caused by large cuts in import tariffs. Over the last three decades, the U.S. manufacturing sec-
tor experienced increased competition from foreign companies due to the removal or reduction of
tariff-related trade barriers. Increased import competition led to significant decreases in the market
shares and profit margins of U.S. companies (see e.g., Tybout (2003); Xu (2012)). Numerous stud-
ies also document effects of increased import competition on innovation and product quality (see,
e.g., Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005); Amiti and Khandelwal (2013); Bloom,
Draca, and Van Reenen (2016)). The staggered nature of tariff cuts, which vary substantially in
2Goel and Thakor (2008) model bias about the variance and Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, and
Stanley (2011) model bias about the mean.
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magnitude, time, and industry, offers an ideal setting to test how different types of CEOs respond
to competitive shocks.
We expect that overconfident CEOs, due to their competitiveness, take more aggressive actions
in response to increased competition. Specifically, we hypothesize that overconfident CEOs re-
spond to tariff cuts with more aggressive price cuts. We also hypothesize that overconfident CEOs
invest more in research and development (R&D), which can increase product differentiation and/or
reduce production costs, both of which can improve competitiveness. Similarly, we hypothesize
that overconfident CEOs invest more in advertising to highlight the advantages of their products
over that of the competitors and potentially build loyalty that protects market share. We note that
it is far from obvious that overconfident CEOs will react to increases in competition in these ways.
Indeed, a clear competing hypothesis is that overconfident CEOs overestimate their firms’ abili-
ties to compete in their current state, i.e., overconfident CEOs believe that their firms are already
sufficiently strong and require no material changes to face increased competition.
Regardless of how overconfident CEOs react to increased competition, there are also compet-
ing hypotheses about the expected outcomes. On the one hand, an overconfident CEO who slashes
prices and increases R&D and advertising may ultimately destroy firm value if their actions are too
aggressive. If overconfident CEOs take no actions because they overestimate their firms’ competi-
tiveness in the current state, then such inaction should also lead to reduced firm value. On the other
hand, aggressive actions may enable an overconfident CEO’s firm to gain or retain market share
and ultimately preserve or increase firm value. We test our predictions using a triple-difference
specification on matched samples of firms affected (treated) and not affected (control) by tariff
shocks and led by overconfident and rational CEOs. The triple-difference specification models
the net effect of the following differences: 1) before and after tariff shocks, 2) between overcon-
fident and rational CEOs, and 3) between tariff-shocked and non-shocked firms. Differences in
the actions and outcomes across overconfident and rational CEOs may capture the differences in
their response to the tariff shocks, but this difference could simply reflect any ‘normal’ difference,
unrelated to competition, between these two types of CEOs. In the triple-difference specification,
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the non-tariff-shocked firms’ responses capture the differences between overconfident and rational
CEOs unrelated to competitive shocks, which are then netted out.
We find that overconfident CEOs do respond differently to increased competition. First, over-
confident CEOs respond to large tariff cuts by immediately slashing their operating profit margin
and gross profit margins. The triple-difference estimate of the treatment effect on operating profit
margin is -30 percentage points for the (-1,+1) year window around the tariff shock year, which is
omitted. This effect for gross margin is -17 percentage points. Overconfident CEOs continue to
exhibit significantly lower operating and gross profit margins when we widen the test window to
the years (-4,+4).3 Reduced margins reflect lower pricing relative to costs. Second, overconfident
CEOs immediately increase investments in R&D. The triple difference estimate of the treatment
effect on R&D-to-sales ratio is +7 percentage points for the (-1,+1) window around the tariff shock
years. Unlike the margins, the increase in R&D loses statistical significance when we widen the
event window to (-3, +3), which implies that overconfident CEOs increase R&D only immediately
after the tariff reductions. Third, overconfident CEOs also increase advertising expenditures, but
the increase comes later. The increase in advertising expense is statistically significant starting
with the event window (-3,+3) around the tariff shock years.
Overall, our results strongly reject the proposition that overconfident CEOs are passive in the
face of increased competition because they overestimate their firms’ ability to compete in their
current state. Instead, the results show that overconfident CEOs respond to increased competition
quickly and aggressively, which is consistent with the economics literature that links overconfi-
dence with competitiveness. Further tests show that our results do not merely reflect a general
tendency of overconfident CEOs to overinvest. For instance, we do not observe significant in-
creases in capital expenditures or acquisitions by overconfident CEOs following the tariff shocks.
Investments in R&D are often aimed at reducing costs or increasing product differentiation. Ad-
vertising is often aimed at highlighting differentiated aspects of products. Thus, our evidence of
3As an alternative, we repeat our analysis using test windows that begin with the most recent pre-shock year
(e.g., (-1, +2), (-1, +3), etc.). This minimizes the potential influence of unrelated changes that may have occurred
in the sample firms during the pre-shock period, but decreases the number of observations used in each analysis. In
untabulated analyses, we observe similar results to those presented using symmetric test windows.
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immediate increases in R&D and subsequent increases in advertising is consistent with strategic
responses to increased competition.
We next turn to the ultimate outcomes of the actions overconfident CEOs take. We find that
firms led by overconfident CEOs gain significant market share after the tariff shocks. These gains
show up quickly, with treatment effects of +19% for the (-1,+1) year window and +34% for the
(-4,+4) window, as a percentage of their pre-shock market share. Given our findings that overcon-
fident CEOs slash margins and increase R&D and advertising expenses, it is easy to envision these
CEOs gaining market share but sacrificing firm value. However, we find this is not the case. Firms
led by overconfident CEOs exhibit increased firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. The triple dif-
ference estimate of the treatment effect on Tobin’s Q is +.354 for the (-1,+1) year window, and it
remains positive and statistically significant through the (-3,+3) window. The estimate of the treat-
ment effect on value remains large in magnitude (0.225) up to the (-4,+4) window, but its p-value
rises to 0.106. Therefore, it appears that investors positively value the responses of overconfident
CEOs to increased competition.
Our identification strategy and triple-difference specification on matched samples helps ensure
that the results are not driven by pre-tariff shock differences between firms led by overconfident
and rational CEOs. They are also unlikely to reflect ‘normal’ differences between such CEOs
even in industries that do not face tariff shocks. Because we also match by CEO-type, the triple
difference approach should also help to ensure that differences across firms that lead them to hire
overconfident versus rational CEOs do not drive the results. Our conclusions would be invalid if
(i) the treated firms with overconfident CEOs would have responded to the increased competition
similarly and achieved the same outcomes that we document (relative to the treated firms with
rational CEOs) even with rational CEOs in place, and (ii) if the same variable(s) lead firms both to
choose overconfident CEOs and to fight competition aggressively with positive outcomes, but only
in treatment firms, not in control firms. It is difficult to envision what would drive these conditions
in (i) and (ii) to be jointly true, particularly given the potential downsides of overconfident CEOs
found in prior studies.
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Moreover, we conduct a battery of placebo tests to check if our results are driven by normal
differences across firms in the absence of a competition shock or by artifacts of our research design.
In one such test, we reassign actual tariff shocks to the treated firms but in non-tariff reduction
years. In another test, we hold the actual tariff shock years constant, but randomly reassign the
shocks across manufacturing firms that did not ultimately experience a tariff shock during the
same year. Finally, we repeat the second placebo test, but randomly reassign the tariff shocks
across non-manufacturing industries. In each case, we repeat our triple-difference analyses using
each sample of placebo tariff shocks. If our results are an artifact of our research design, are
caused by unobserved differences among the firms that hire overconfident and rational CEOs or by
differences in the actions of overconfident and rational CEOs under normal conditions, we would
expect to find similar results under these placebo tests. However, we find no significant impact of
CEO overconfidence across these placebo tests.
We cannot rule out the possibility that some firms deliberately choose overconfident CEOs to
exploit states of the world in which competition increases. However, we emphasize that even with
an endogenous selection of overconfident CEOs, the exogenous nature of the tariff shocks still per-
mits us to test differences in how overconfident CEOs versus rational CEOs behave in the face of
increased competition. Malmendier and Tate (2005) make a similar point that endogenous CEO-
firm matching does not alter their main conclusions about overconfidence and investment. En-
dogenous matching would be problematic if the research design required random or quasi-random
assignments of CEO confidence types. Our research design takes the CEO types as given, and then
studies how they react to exogenous shocks that increase competition.
Our study contributes to two main strands of literature. First, it joins a growing body of work
that explores potential benefits of overconfident CEOs (Galasso and Simcoe (2011); Hirshleifer,
Low, and Teoh (2012); Phua, Tham, and Wei (2018)). Given that we compare reactions and out-
comes for overconfident and rational CEOs in a setting where competition increases, our results
imply a somewhat unusual interpretation of the effect of overconfidence. By definition, an over-
confident CEO overestimates the mean of an important firm input (e.g., ability) or output (e.g.,
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return or value), and thus should turn out to be incorrect when compared to the realized value.
Prior studies that examine investment, acquisitions, and other policy choices confirm that the bias
of overconfident CEOs can lead to inferior decisions and outcomes. In a competitive setting, how-
ever, the means of the outcome variables are endogenous in the industry and depend directly on
the actions taken by the competitors. Our results show that, compared to rational CEOs, over-
confident CEOs respond to increased competition quickly and aggressively, and that such actions
ultimately lead to increased firm value relative to the firms led by rational CEOs. In this sense,
these CEOs’ biases turn out to be beneficial because they ‘win’ the competitive contest (relative to
rational CEOs) and thereby positively influence the realized outcomes even though they may have
incorrectly estimated them. The combination of our results with the economics literature link-
ing overconfidence and competition suggests that the value of CEO overconfidence can depend
critically on the level of competition a firm faces.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the effects of import competition. Most prior studies
on the effect of import competition examine the aggregate response of firms, or the heterogeneity
of such responses based on firm-characteristics (e.g. Valta (2012); Xu (2012); Frésard and Valta
(2015)). Our study shows that it is also important to examine heterogeneity in managerial char-
acteristics. In other words, a firm’s competitive advantage or disadvantage with respect to import
competition may depend not only on what the firm does or has, but also on who manages the firm.
3.2 Hypotheses
As described in the introduction, a number of studies in the economics literature establish
that overconfident agents tend to be more competitive. Starting from that premise, we formulate
hypotheses about how overconfident CEOs react to increases in competition, and how their firms
fare given those actions. Our identification strategy relies on exogenous reductions in tariffs as
shocks to the competition that firms face, so we discuss our hypotheses in the context of tariff
reductions.
Tariff reductions make the prices of goods from foreign firms lower. When we couple the
tariff reductions with the fact that foreign firms often have production cost advantages over do-
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mestic firms, it is clear that domestic firms likely face increased price competition from foreign
firms following tariff reductions. Tybout (2003) and Xu (2012) find evidence consistent with this
proposition.
We begin by formulating hypotheses about how overconfident CEOs respond on the pricing
dimension. Ideally, we would observe and examine product prices, but there are no large-scale
data or other sources that contain information on firms’ product prices. Thus, we formulate our
hypotheses in terms of firms’ gross and operating profit margins. The gross profit margin reflects
decisions about the prices a firm sets over the cost of production. The operating profit margin
reflects decisions about the prices a firm sets over the costs of production, selling, and general ad-
ministration. Conditional on costs, more aggressive pricing will lead to lower operating and gross
profit margins. Thus, we hypothesize that overconfident CEOs, who are likely more competitive
according to prior studies in the economic literature, respond to increased competition with more
aggressive price reductions as evidenced by reduced gross and operating profit margins compared
to those for firms led by rational CEOs.
A clear competing hypothesis to the margin reduction one is that overconfident CEOs overesti-
mate the strength of their firms’ current ability to meet increased competition without any changes
to their firms, and thereby remain relatively passive in the face of increased competition. For exam-
ple, an overconfident CEO may overestimate the loyalty of his firm’s customers or their perceived
value of his firm’s products, and conclude that price reductions are unnecessary. Under this com-
peting hypothesis, we would expect to observe that overconfident CEOs do not change (or might
even increase relatively) their gross and operating profit margins so that their firms’ post-tariff
shock margins end up being greater than those of firms led by rational CEOs.
Product differentiation and cost advantages are other ways that firms can respond to new com-
petitive threats. Firms often use investments in research and development to attempt to differentiate
their products and/or to lower production costs. Increasing R&D for either of these reasons could
be an effective response to increased competition. Thus, we hypothesize that after the tariff shock,
overconfident CEOs increase R&D spending more aggressively than rational CEOs do. As with
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the margin reduction hypothesis, the competing hypothesis is that overconfident CEOs overesti-
mate the attractiveness or cost advantages of their existing products, and thus remain relatively
passive when competition increases. In this case, firms led by overconfident CEOs should exhibit
lower (or unchanged) post-tariff shock R&D spending than firms led by rational CEOs.
Firms can use advertising to attempt to increase demand generically for commodity-type prod-
ucts, but they can also use advertising to highlight differences between their products and those of
competitors and/or to build brand loyalty. Highlighting differentiated product features and building
loyalty should be effective responses to increased competition. We hypothesize that overconfident
CEOs increase post-tariff shock advertising more aggressively than rational CEOs do. Similar to
the case for R&D, a competing hypothesis is that overconfident CEOs remain relatively passive in
the face of increased competition because they overestimate consumers’ knowledge of their prod-
ucts and/or overestimate consumers’ brand loyalty to them. Under this hypothesis, firms led by
overconfident CEOs should exhibit lower (or the same) post-tariff shock advertising spending than
firms led by rational CEOs.
The hypotheses above are about actions that CEOs take in response to increased competition.
We next formulate hypotheses about the outcomes of the actions, specifically market share and firm
value. As before, there are also competing hypotheses about the expected outcomes. We would
expect that an overconfident CEO who reduces profit margins and increases R&D and advertising
would ultimately gain market share. Thus, we hypothesize that firms led by overconfident CEOs
gain more market share than firms led by rational CEOs. The competing hypothesis is that firms
led by overconfident CEOs lose market share relative to firms with rational CEOs because the
overconfident CEOs overestimate their firms’ current ability to compete and thus are passive in
response to increased competition; in contrast, firms led by the rational CEOs actively reduce
pricing and invest in R&D and advertising so that they can maintain or increase market share.
Finally, we consider how firm value is affected when firms with overconfident versus rational
CEOs face competitive shocks. Aggressive price reductions and investments in advertising and
R&D by an overconfident CEO could end up increasing firm value in a competitive process. Thus,
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we hypothesize that firms led by overconfident CEOs exhibit value increases above that of firms
led by rational CEOs after the tariff shocks. For a competing hypothesis, we note that a firm could
easily gain market share relative to its rivals by pricing its products too low and over-investing in
advertising and R&D but destroy firm value in the process. If CEOs’ overconfidence causes them
to be too passive in response to increased competition, we should also observe lower firm values
after the tariff shocks compared to firms led by rational CEOs.
3.3 Data and Empirical Design
To test the implications of CEO overconfidence on firm actions and outcomes under increased
competition, the ideal experiment would be to randomly assign CEOs to similar firms experiencing
a competitive shock (hereafter, referred to as treated firms) and observe changes in such firms’
behaviors post shock. Random assignment of CEOs, however, is clearly not plausible. Indeed, it
seems plausible that some firms may purposely select overconfident CEOs. Thus, we recognize
that there can be endogenous matching between CEOs and firms, and then test for differences in
the reactions by rational versus overconfident CEOs when competition increases exogenously.
We use tariff reductions as exogenous shocks that increase competition. We study two groups
of firms – matched on firm and CEO characteristics – one of which is subject to tariff shocks, the
other is not. We explain our measures and empirical specifications as follows.
3.3.1 Tariff Shocks
In the last few decades, the United States has increased global trade flows by reducing trade
barriers, specifically, import tariffs. Such tariff reductions have made imports from foreign firms
cheaper in the United States and made domestic firms more vulnerable to competition. For ex-
ample, domestic firms have lost market share and reduced profit margins (see Tybout (2003), and
the references therein). We use substantial tariff reductions as exogenous changes in the levels of
competition within an industry.4
We follow Frésard (2010), Valta (2012), and Frésard and Valta (2015) to calculate annual tariffs
4Several other papers have used tariff changes as a shock to competition e.g. Xu (2012), Lileeva and Trefler (2010)
among others
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for manufacturing industries (SIC 2000 to 3999) from 1972 to 2005. We then use import data from
Peter Schott’s website to extend the sample through 2012 following Feenstra (1996), Feenstra, Ro-
malis, and Schott (2002), and Schott (2010).5 Import tariff is defined as the ratio of the total duties
collected to the total value of imports for a given industry. Our overconfidence measures from Ex-
ecuComp are available only after 1992. However, we collect the full time series of tariff changes
so that we can define economically large tariff reductions in relation to the full time series of tariff
changes. To balance the need for economically substantial tariff cuts against sample size concerns
created by the need for additional variables in our analysis (e.g., overconfidence measures), we
focus on the tariff cuts that are at least 3.5 times larger than the median cut from 1990 to 2012.
We ignore tariff changes in 1988-89 because there was a change in the import codes in 1989.6 To
ensure that we capture permanent tariff reductions only, we discard tariff cuts that were followed
by equivalently large tariff increases in the two years following the initial cut. From this process,
we identify 47 unique industries that experienced at least one substantial cut for our sample period
between 1992 and 2012. Figure E.1 gives the distribution of cuts for the industry-years in our
sample.
3.3.2 CEO Overconfidence
We follow Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, and
Stanley (2011) to identify overconfident CEOs based on Execucomp data. The classification mea-
sure, based on option holdings, is obtainable for a large sample of CEOs over a long period, and
has been validated using media-based measures by several other studies. We classify a CEO as
overconfident if he or she holds vested options that are at least 67% in the money.7 Specifically, for
each CEO, we first calculate the realizable value per option as the ratio of the total realizable value
of the exercisable options and the number of exercisable options. We then calculate the moneyness
5We thank Laurent Frésard and Philip Valta for making the tariff data from 1972-2005 public (https://
terpconnect.umd.edu/~lfresard/). We also thank Peter Schott for making data available at http:
//faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/sub_international.htm.
6For more details, refer to the Internet Appendix of Frésard (2010).
7The 67% threshold was calculated by Malmendier and Tate (2005) using proprietary data and calibrating the
model by Hall and Murphy (2002). Following Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley (2011), we
take the 67% threshold as given.
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of vested but unexercised options by subtracting the realizable value per option from the end of
year stock price to estimate an exercise price. We identify the years in which CEOs hold vested
options that are at least 67% in the money. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they exhibit such
behavior at least twice during their tenure, starting from the first time they display such behavior.
The rest of the CEOs are classified as rational although we recognize that some of these CEOs
could actually suffer from a pessimism bias.
Many prior studies of CEO overconfidence employ media-based measures in addition to the
option holding-based measure that we use. Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, and Stan-
ley (2011) conduct tests to validate the option-based measure, one of which validates it against a
media-based measure. In Malmendier and Tate (2008), Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011), Galasso
and Simcoe (2011), Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012), Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, and Nanda
(2015), and Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, Nanda, and Tham (2018), media-based measures and
the option holding-based measures yield similar results. As we discuss below, our sample criteria
yield us 168 treated firms. We do not employ a media-based measure in our analyses because
media-based measures used in prior studies almost uniformly result in much smaller samples, they
represent noisier measures of overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate (2008)), and in prior studies
yield results generally similar to those obtained by option-based measures.
3.3.3 Empirical Specification
Our triple difference specification compares pre-to-post differences in matched treated and
untreated overconfident CEOs to the differences in matched treated and untreated rational CEOs.
Treated firms are those in the manufacturing industries that face tariff reductions. Untreated firms
are chosen from manufacturing industries (SIC codes 2000-3999) that are not shocked by tariff
reductions in the relevant time windows that we study. We match on several important firm and
CEO characteristics. Matching on firm characteristics allows us to compare firms that are similar
to each other before the shock and differ only in tariff shock. Matching on CEOs’ overconfidence
levels and incentives allows us to ensure that we compare firms that hire and incentivize CEOs in
a similar manner.
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Specifically, for each treated firm we find a control firm based on minimizing the Mahanalobis
distance in terms of firm and CEO characteristics. The Mahanalobis distance between two firms
j and k is given by
√
((xj − xk)′W−1x (xj − xk)) where, x is a vector of covariates and W is
the variance-covariance matrix of the covariates. Following Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and
Weisbenner (2012) and Frésard and Valta (2015), we match on firm size (log of assets), leverage
ratio (ratio of long term debt to total assets), growth opportunities (log of market to book assets),
cash flow ratio (cash flow to total assets), and cash-to-asset ratio. We also match on the log of CEO
delta and the log of CEO vega, which we calculate following Core and Guay (2002), Coles, Daniel,
and Naveen (2006), and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2013). We exact match by the year and the
CEO’s overconfidence indicator (rational vs. overconfident). A tariff reduction is an industry-level
event, so it precludes exact matching on the industry. We choose matching firms with replacement
based on one year lagged covariates. Matching with replacement ensures the closest possible
matches.
We use the matched sample to estimate the following triple difference-in-differences regression
specification:
yit = β1 post+ β2 treated+ β3 optimism+ β4 post ∗ treated+ β5 treated ∗ optimism+
β6 post ∗ optimism+ β7 post ∗ treated ∗ optimism+ β′8Xi,t−1 + ηt + γj + eit (3.1)
where t is the time index and i is the firm index, ηt are year fixed effects, and γj are industry
fixed effects. The dependent variable is the firm action or outcome variable of interest. We study
several dependent variables in line with our hypotheses. The action variables include gross and
operating profit margins, advertising expense to sales ratio, and research and development (R&D)
expense to sales ratio. We set advertising and R&D equal to zero when they are missing, and
include dummy variables indicating these missing observations. The outcome variables of interest
include market share, defined as the natural log of the ratio of firm sales and industry sales, and
firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. Post equals 1 for the years after and 0 for the years before the
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tariff shock. Treated is a dummy that identifies firms experiencing a tariff shock (treated = 1) and
their matched control firm (treated = 0). Overconfidence equals 1 if the CEO is overconfident and
0 otherwise. X is a vector of control variables. We control for all covariates used in the matching
process. We also include idiosyncratic volatility and dummy variables for the firm-years with
CEO-Chair duality and CEO turnovers. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. Tobin’s Q has a more highly skewed distribution, so we winsorize it at the 5th and 95th
percentiles. Appendix D.1 contains the definitions of all dependent and independent variables.
The coefficient of interest is the one on the triple interaction term, β7. It captures how firm
actions and outcomes after the tariff shocks vary across treated firms with overconfident CEOs and
with rational CEOs using the differences between untreated rational and overconfident CEOs as
baseline counterfactuals.
Given that the tariff shocks take place at the industry-level, we cluster standard errors by indus-
try. We estimate regression results for four symmetric event windows centered on the tariff shock
years, indicated as (-1,+1), (-2,+2), (-3,+3), and (-4,+4), respectively. Each window excludes the
tariff shock year (year 0). When we estimate asymmetric windows all beginning at -1, the results
are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported. If we include only the endpoint years,
e.g., only years -4 and +4 and not the intervening years, the number of observations falls, causing
a loss of power and statistical significance on many of the coefficients.
3.3.4 Sample and Descriptive Statistics
Our sample starts in 1992, the first year Execucomp data is available, and ends in 2012, the last
year for which we have tariff data. Because tariff shocks pertain to manufacturing industries only,
we limit our analysis to firms in industries with SIC codes (SICH) between 2000 and 3999. We
exclude industries with SIC codes ending in ‘0’ and ‘9’ because they do not identify economically
meaningful industries (Clarke (1989)). We replace any missing SIC codes for a firm with its prior
year’s SIC code. We exclude firms with missing assets or negative sales and drop observations with
missing values for covariates used in matching. We drop firm-years for which the CEO has fewer
than two years of tenure because we need at least two observations to classify a CEO’s confidence.
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We require that both the treated and control firms have at least one year of data available before and
after the tariff shock. Our final sample consists of 168 treated firms and their respective matches
from non-tariff shocked industries.
Table F.1 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel B of Table F.1 presents descrip-
tive statistics for the firm and CEO characteristics for treated and control firms for the year prior
to the tariff shock. It also reports the p-values for the difference in means (covariate balance) tests
between treated and matched control firms assuming unequal variances of the matching covariates.
All the difference in means tests are statistically insignificant indicating that the treated firms and
the matched control firms are similar in the observable covariates.
Before we turn to the triple difference regression results, we present tests for parallel trends
across the treated and control firms in Panel C of Table F.1. We test for differences in the year-to-
year changes in the outcome variables between years -4 and -1 relative to the corresponding tariff
shock year. The pre-tariff-shock trends for all the action and outcome variables are statistically in-
distinguishable across treated and control firms, which indicates that the parallel trends assumption
is satisfied.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Actions in response to increased competition from tariff reductions
We first present results testing the hypothesis that overconfident CEOs respond to increases
in competition with aggressive reductions in their gross and operating profit margins that reflect
more aggressive pricing relative to production and sales costs. Table F.2 presents the results for
operating and gross profit margins. We do not tabulate the control variables to conserve space.
Panel A presents the results in which operating margin is the dependent variable. We find sig-
nificantly negative coefficients on the triple interaction term for each of the four event windows.
The coefficients range from -0.171 to -0.295 with p-values ranging between 0.004 and 0.012. The
results suggest that overconfident CEOs respond very quickly to tariff reductions by reducing their
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operating margin by 29.5 percentage points in the first year after the tariff reduction.8 These cuts
remain statistically significant up to the (-4,+4) window. We interpret these results as evidence of
aggressive price reductions relative to production and sales costs. It is worth emphasizing that the
triple-difference estimates reveal the additional reduction in profit margins by firms with overcon-
fident CEOs compared to those with rational CEOs. Therefore, these results do not merely reflect
the fact that increased competition reduces the profit margins of all domestic firms.
Panel B of Table F.2 presents the results where gross profit margin is the dependent variable.
As with the operating profit margin, we find significantly negative coefficients on the triple inter-
action term across all the four event windows. These coefficients indicate that overconfident CEOs
respond very quickly to tariff reductions by reducing their gross margin by 17.3 percentage points
in the first year. These cuts remain significant in all four event windows with p-values for ranging
from 0.017 to 0.045. We interpret these results as additional evidence of aggressive price reduc-
tions relative to production costs. Thus, the results for operating margin in Panel A are not driven
solely by increases in selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs relative to sales.
We next present results for the hypotheses that overconfident CEOs respond to increases in
competition with aggressive increases in R&D and advertising. Table F.3 shows the triple differ-
ence regression results for the R&D-to-sales ratio. We find significantly positive coefficients on
the triple interaction term for the (-1,+1) and (-2,+2) year event windows around the tariff shock
years. These results indicate that overconfident CEOs respond very quickly to tariff reductions by
increasing R&D-to-sales by 7.4 percentage points in the first year (p-value = 0.007) and 4.2 per-
centage points during the (-2,+2) window (p-value = 0.072). The coefficients for the longer event
windows are positive, but they are statistically insignificant. Thus, overconfident CEOs respond to
increased competition with aggressive new investments in R&D mainly in the first two years after
the tariff reductions.
8These effects are quite large economically, so it is worth emphasizing that they are not driven solely by the
triple difference specification. On a univariate basis (untabulated), the mean operating profit margin for treated firms
led by rational CEOs rises just over five percentage points from the pre-shock to post-shock periods, whereas the
comparable figure for treated firms led by overconfident CEOs falls by just over 10 percentage points, for a total
univariate difference of approximately negative 15 percentage points. By comparison, the triple difference regression
coefficient estimate for the same time windows is approximately negative 17 percentage points.
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Table F.4 contains results for the triple difference regressions for the advertising-to-sales ratio.
We find that overconfident CEOs increase advertising, but with a delay, as a response to increased
competition. The coefficients on the triple interaction term are positive but statistically insignifi-
cant for (-1,+1) and (-2,+2) windows. For (-3,+3) and (-4,+4) windows, the coefficients are 0.013
and 0.015, respectively, and both are statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, overconfident
CEOs increase advertising more intensively than do rational CEOs following a tariff shock, but the
increases occur later in their competitive strategy. These results contrast with our earlier findings
that overconfident CEOs respond to competitive shocks very quickly with price cuts and R&D (i.e.,
beginning in the first year after the tariff shock). Although we cannot see a way to test it, we con-
jecture that firms may increase advertising with a delay to highlight either product differentiation
or price competitiveness that resulted from increases in R&D immediately after the tariff shocks
(shown above in Table F.3).
Taken together, the results in Tables F.2 through F.4 firmly reject the broad hypothesis that
overconfident CEOs remain passive in the face of increased competition because they overesti-
mate their firms’ abilities to compete in their current states. Instead, the results show that overcon-
fident CEOs respond more aggressively to increased competition than their rational counterparts
by slashing their operating and gross profit margins and increasing R&D and advertising. The
changes in profit margins and R&D happen almost immediately, i.e., within a year after the tariff
shock. On the other hand, advertising increases later by three to four years after the shock.
We next turn to our hypotheses about whether having an overconfident CEO benefits a firm
that faces a sudden increase in competition. We investigate the impact of CEO overconfidence on
the firm’s market share and market value following a tariff reduction.
3.4.2 Outcomes following tariff shocks
Given the earlier results showing more aggressive competitive actions by overconfident CEOs,
we next test how these actions affect firm outcomes, specifically, market share and firm value. We
present the results of the triple difference regressions of market share in Table F.5. The dependent
variable is the natural log of market share, so the coefficient on the triple interaction term is the
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estimate of the treatment effect on the percentage increase in market share. We find that the coeffi-
cients remain positive across all the four time windows around the tariff shock years, and increase
monotonically with the time windows. The coefficient for the (-1,+1) window is 0.194 (p-value
= 0.099), which increases to 0.294 (p-value = 0.026), 0.338 (p-value = 0.027) and 0.342 (p-value
= 0.036) for the (-2,+2), (-3,+3), and (-4,+4) windows, respectively. Thus, following tariff shocks
that increase competition, firms led by overconfident CEOs show significant increases in market
share relative to firms led by rational CEOs.
Given that overconfident CEOs slash operating and gross margins but increase advertising and
R&D more aggressively than rational CEOs, the relative increases in market share are not too
surprising. An important question, however, is whether these actions are optimal from a firm
value standpoint. On the one hand, a firm could easily gain market share relative to its rivals
by pricing its products too low and overinvesting in advertising and R&D, and yet destroy firm
value in the process. Indeed, prior studies on overinvestment by overconfident CEOs suggest this
is a quite plausible outcome. On the other hand, the competitive actions by overconfident CEOs
could ultimately increase firm value relative to that of firms led by rational CEOs because more
aggressive actions could make the overconfident CEO ‘win’ the competition against rational CEOs.
Thus, we next test the hypothesis that firms led by overconfident CEOs exhibit increased firm value
(measured by Tobin’s Q) following the tariff shocks.
The results for the triple difference regressions for Tobin’s Q are in Table F.6. We find evi-
dence to support the hypothesis that the actions by overconfident CEOs are value increasing. The
coefficient on the triple interaction term for the (-1, +1) window is 0.354 with a p-value of 0.066.
The coefficient is 0.371 (p-value = 0.022) for the (-2, +2) window and is 0.278 (p-value = 0.062)
the (-3, +3) window. For the (-4, +4) window, the coefficient is still large economically at 0.225,
but the p-value rises to 0.106. These effects are quite large economically, so it is worth noting that
they are not driven solely by the triple difference specification on a univariate basis (untabulated),
the mean Tobin’s Q for firms led by overconfident CEO rises 0.47 from pre-shock to post-shock,
whereas the Tobin’s Q for firms led by rational CEOs barely changes. Thus, increases in firm value
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show up quickly by year +1 for firms led by overconfident CEOs, which implies that investors view
the CEOs’ aggressive actions that we find earlier as value increasing.
3.4.3 Placebo Tests and Other Analysis
We consider various endogeneity issues and alternative explanations that may affect our in-
ferences. One concern is that, despite our careful use of exogenous shocks to competition and a
matched-sample approach, our results may solely reflect matching of firm- and CEO-types. For in-
stance, aggressive CEOs are matched with aggressive firms, which implies that these firms would
have responded similarly to competition regardless of who the CEO was. Our triple difference
specification includes CEO overconfidence as a matching variable, so our analysis compares an
overconfident CEO (a rational CEO) in a treated firm to another overconfident CEO (a rational
CEO) in a control firm. This strategy minimizes concerns about unobserved firm characteristics
driving both selection of a CEO type and the aggressiveness of the firm’s actions. Our conclusions
would be invalid if (i) the treated firms with overconfident CEOs would have taken the same com-
petitive actions and achieved the same outcomes that we document (relative to the treated firms
with rational CEOs) even with rational CEOs in place, and (ii) if the same set of underlying vari-
ables cause the treatment firms, but not the control firms, both to choose overconfident CEOs and
to fight competition aggressively achieving increased market share and firm value. We cannot en-
vision what would satisfy both of these conditions jointly, especially given the potential downsides
of overconfident CEOs documented in the prior literature.
A related concern is that our results reflect differences in the behaviors of overconfident and
rational CEOs during normal firm conditions that are not fully removed in our triple-difference
specification. This could occur, for instance, if a higher proportion of sample firms facing a tariff
shock are from relatively innovative industries in which overconfident CEOs are more valuable
unconditional on a shock to competition (Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012)). To examine this
possibility, we classify innovative industries following Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012), and
repeat our tests excluding firms in innovative industries. Although not reported in a table, we find
that the results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those reported, with two exceptions.
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Although the coefficient signs and magnitudes do not differ substantially from those presented, we
find that the p-values increase to 0.173 and 0.143 for the coefficients of interest when we analyze
gross margin in the (-1,+1) window and when we analyze R&D in the (-2,+2) window, respectively.
Thus, the results do not appear to be driven by firms in innovative industries accounting for a
disproportionate number of treated firms.
To further address related concerns, we conduct three sets of placebo tests. First, we use the
actual treated firms, but we randomly assign pseudo tariff reduction years among them in place
of the actual tariff reduction years. This research design for the placebo test matches our actual
research design in all aspects except that we apply pseudo tariff reduction years to treated firms.
The pseudo tariff reduction years are restricted to those years in which the firm was not actually
subject to a tariff reduction. We require that the placebo reduction year be at least four years from
an actual tariff reduction to avoid picking up the effects of a true tariff reduction. If our results
were driven by systematic differences between treated and control firms that lead to differing CEO
actions unconditional on the tariff shock (including industries innovation), we would expect to find
similar results when analyzing these placebo tariff shocks. We present the results of the placebo
tariff reduction tests for each of our dependent variables of interest in Table F.7. To conserve space,
we tabulate only the coefficients on the triple interaction term and their respective p-values. We
find no significant impact of CEO overconfidence on any of the dependent variables in the triple
difference regressions in the post-placebo-tariff-reduction years, regardless of the event window.
Moreover, the insignificant coefficients frequently do not even share the same sign with our main
results and/or are generally much closer to zero in magnitude.
As an additional placebo test, we take the actual tariff reduction years as given, and construct
placebo ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ firms from among firms in manufacturing industries (firms in
SIC codes 2000-3999) that are not treated by actual tariff reductions. Again here, the research
design for the placebo test matches our actual research design in all aspects except that we apply
it to randomly chosen firms from non-treated manufacturing industries. The results are reported
in Table F.8. In Table F.9, we repeat the placebo test from Table F.8 except that we choose the
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pseudo treated and untreated firms from among firms in non-manufacturing industries (firms out-
side SIC codes 2000-3999). In both Tables F.8 and F.9, we find no significant impact of CEO
overconfidence on any of the dependent variables in the triple difference regressions except for
one coefficient for advertising that is statistically significant but opposite in sign from the effect
in our main regressions. In sum, multiple placebo tests show convincingly that our identification
strategy and research design do not yield significant coefficients on the triple interaction terms in
scenarios where they should not. Thus, the results we present in our main tests are very unlikely
to be driven by any particular aspects of the research design.
Another related concern is that our results could be driven by CEOs who were hired after the
tariff shock, and whose selection was driven by the shock. We attempt to remove this effect by
controlling for CEO turnovers that occur during the tariff shock window throughout our analysis.
To further rule out the concern, we repeat our analysis using only firms whose CEOs were already
in place in the year prior to the tariff shock and remained through the fourth post-tariff shock year.
Our results are substantively unchanged from those reported in the tables, with four exceptions.
We no longer find significant evidence of overconfident CEOs increasing advertising expenses in
the (-3, +3) window (p-value increases to 0.12), or gaining market share in the (-1, +1) window
(p-value increases to 0.19). On the other hand, two results that were statistically insignificant in the
main analysis become significant with the restricted sample: overconfident CEOs increase R&D
spending in the (-3, +3) window and increase Tobin’s Q in the (-4, +4) window. As such, our
results are not driven by CEOs that were hired in response to the tariff shocks.
Finally, we want to consider the possibility that our results for R&D are merely reflective of a
general tendency of overconfident CEOs to overinvest. Kang, Kang, Kang, and Kim (2018) find
that overconfident CEOs increase total investment by more than rational CEOs do when economic
uncertainty is high. One of the uncertainty shocks that they use is tariff shocks. They measure total
investment as the sum of R&D, capital expenditures, and acquisitions.
In Table F.10, we report results of our triple difference regressions using total investment as the
dependent variable. As shown in Panel A, we find that overconfident CEOs increase total invest-
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ment significantly more than rational CEOs do for the (-1,+1) and (-2,+2) event windows. In Panels
B through D, we present regression results for each of the three components of total investment–
R&D, capital expenditures, and acquisitions–respectively. Panel B for R&D simply replicates the
results that we presented earlier in the paper. In Panel C, we observe a small increase in capital ex-
penditures for the (-1,+1) window, but statistically insignificant coefficients for all other windows.
In Panel D, we observe no statistically significant changes in acquisition expenditures for any time
window. Thus, the results for total investment in Panel A are driven almost entirely by R&D.
The results in Table F.10 show that our main findings are not merely reflective of a general
tendency of overconfident CEOs to overinvest because we do not observe significant increases in
capital expenditures or acquisitions. The increase in R&D that we find is consistent with a strategy
to cut costs and/or differentiate products, both of which are especially important when competition
rises. Thus, our results support the view that overconfident CEOs respond to tariff shocks with
investments specifically tailored to address increased competition.
3.5 Conclusion
We examine differences in reactions by rational CEOs and overconfident CEOs when their
firms face exogenous tariff shocks that increase competition. Using a triple-difference specification
on matched samples of treated and untreated firms led by rational vs. overconfident CEOs, we
find that firms led by overconfident CEOs slash their profit margins and increase advertising and
research and development significantly more intensively than rational CEOs do. The aggressive
competitive actions by overconfident CEOs lead to increased market share and value for their firms
relative to firms led by rational CEOs. Our results contribute to the literature by documenting
another setting in which CEO overconfidence is beneficial for shareholders. They also show that
differences in firm management matter for how firms respond to tariff shocks.
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4. CONCLUSION
The two chapters in this dissertation examine the effect of changes in a firm’s competitive
environment on its profitability and value. Firms competitive environment affect their corporate
policies. A firm aims to maximize shareholder value and considers the strategic interactions it has
with its industry-peers before choosing a course of action. The objective of these chapters is to
further our understanding of how competition affect firm behavior. They highlight the importance
of taking into account firms’ product characteristics and managerial characteristics in evaluating
their responses and outcomes to changes in the competitive environment.
In the first essay, I study the effect of common ownership on firm outcomes. Two firms are
commonly owned when they are at least partially owned by the same set of investors. The rise of
institutional ownership has made this phenomenon particularly prevalent in the last decade. Several
theoretical papers have concluded that common ownership reduces firms’ incentives to compete.
However, given that a firm’s product characteristics affect its ability to compete, I hypothesize
and find that the anti-competitive effects of common ownership are stronger for firms with similar
products. I use two quasi-natural experiments to exogenously vary a firm’s common ownership
levels and find that firms with similar products have higher product prices when they experience an
increase in common ownership. I conduct several robustness tests and find that long-term investors
drive my results.
In the second essay, co-authored with Shane A. Jonhson, T. Colin Campbell, and Binay Ad-
hikari, we study if managerial biases affect a firm’s product outcomes when a firm is faced with
import competition. Specifically, we examine the effects of CEO overconfidence on a firm’s abil-
ity to compete. We find that, compared to firms with rational CEOs, firms with overconfident
CEOs react more aggressively to changes in import competition. Overconfident CEOs respond to
competition by aggressive price cuts as measured by gross margin and operating margins. They
also increase R&D and advertising expenditures potentially to differentiate their products. These
actions enable overconfident CEOs to gain market share and improve firm value.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS FOR SECTION 2
57
Table A.1: Variable Definitions
Explanatory Variables:
ComOwn The percentage of a firm’s shares owned by institutional investors that hold at least
one rival firm within the same industry. I first calculate the percentage of shares held
in each quarter, and then average over the fiscal year to get a firm-year measure.
PropPeer The number of unique industry peers a firm is connected to in a year divided by the
total firms, excluding the firm itself, in that industry-year. I calculate the proportion
of industry peers the firm is connected to in each quarter, and then average over the
fiscal year to get a firm-year measure.
NumMgnr The number of common owners a firm has in a year. I first calculate the number of
common owners a firm has in a quarter and then average it over the fiscal year to get
a firm-year measure. An institutional investor is a common owner if she holds at least
one other firm in the same industry.
ATSIM For a firm i, the pairwise similarity score with firm j is one minus the cosine distance
of vector Vi and Vj , where Vi is the vector of i’s product description reported in its
annual report. The pairwise measure is averaged over all firms.
ATSIM-SIC For a firm i, the pairwise similarity score with firm j is one minus the cosine distance
of vector Vi and Vj , where Vi is the vector of i’s product description reported in its
annual report. The pairwise measure is averaged over all firms in the industry, where
industry is defined using 4-digit SIC code.
ATSIM-FIC For a firm i, the pairwise similarity score with firm j is one minus the cosine distance
of vector Vi and Vj , where Vi is the vector of i’s product description reported in its
annual report. The pairwise measure is averaged over all firms in the industry, where
industry is defined using the FIC400 code.
Outcome Variables:
Ind. Adjusted Gross Margin Industry-adjusted gross margin is the firm’s gross margin minus the average gross
margin of the industry. The firm’s gross margin is (SALE - COGS) / SALE.
Ind. Adjusted R&D to sales
ratio
Industry-adjusted R&D to sales ratio is the firm’s R&D to sales ratio minus the average
R&D to sales ratio of the industry. The firm’s R&D to sales ratio is XRD / SALE.
Ind. Adjusted EBITDA to
sales ratio
Industry-adjusted EBITDA to SALE ratio is the firm’s EBITDA to sales ratio minus
the average EBITDA to sales ratio of the industry. The firm’s EBITDA to sales ratio
is EBITDA / SALE.
Ind. Adjusted NI to sales ra-
tio
Industry-adjusted NI to SALE ratio is the firm’s net income to sales ratio minus the




Log of Assets Natural log of total assets (AT) of a firm.
Log of Market to Book Natural log of a firm’s market value of equity (CSHO * PRCC_F) plus book value
of debt (DLTT + DLC) divided by its book value of assets (AT) (Chava, Huang, and
Johnson (2017)).
Cash to Assets A firm’s cash and cash equivalents (CHE) to the firm’s total assets (AT).
Advertising to Assets A firm’s advertising expenses (XAD) to the firm’s total assets (AT). Missing XAD is
replaced with zero.
R&D to Sales A firm’s research and development expenses (XRD) to the firm’s total assets (AT).
Missing XRD is replaced with zero.
Leverage Ratio A firm’s long term debt (DLTT) divided by its total assets (AT).
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is the sum of the square of market shares of all the firms
in an industry. Market share is defined as the sale of a given firm divided by total
industry sales. Industry is defined using either 4-digit SIC code or FIC400 code.
Because market share is in decimal points, HHI ranges from 0 to 1.
Pct shares held by Inst. Inv. The percentage of shares held by all institutional investors in a given fiscal year. This
measure is calculated quarterly and is then averaged over the firm’s fiscal year.
Number of firms in the in-
dustry
Count of the number of firms in a given industry-year.
M&As of Financial Institutions:
CODummy CODummy is equal to 1 if the firm is held by the acquirer (target) and the acquirer
(target) holds another firm in the same industry.
LnNumPeers LnNumPeers is the natural log of one plus the number of same industry peers a firm
is connected to.
Treated In the quarter prior to the announcement date, if firm i is in acquirer’s (target’s) port-
folio and the target (acquirer) holds another firm in the same industry, then firm i is
classified as treated.
Control If firm j is in acquirer’s (target’s) portfolio and the target (acquirer) does not hold any
firm in the same industry, then firm j is classified as a control firm.
Mutual Fund Scandal IV:
ScandalComOwn The ratio of percentage of shares held by common mutual funds that were affected
by the scandal and the percentage of shares held by all common owners. ScandalCo-
mOwn is used to instrument for ComOwn.
Block Diagonal Regression Variables:
ComOwn Similarity Quar-
tile j
For a firm, it is equal to ComOwn if the firm belongs to an industry that is in the
similarity quartile j, 0 otherwise.
PropPeer Similarity Quartile
j
For a firm, it is equal to PropPeer if the firm belongs to an industry that is in the
similarity quartile j, 0 otherwise.
NumMgnr Similarity Quar-
tile j
For a firm, it is equal to NumMgnr if the firm belongs to an industry that is in the
similarity quartile j, 0 otherwise.
Sim Quartile j Dummy For a firm, it is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to an industry that is in the similarity
quartile j, 0 otherwise.
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APPENDIX B
NAMES OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS USED IN QUASI-NATURAL EXPERIMENTS IN
SECTION 2
B.1 List of Mergers and Acquisitions
Below is the list of mergers and acquisitions that are used in the experiment outlined in Section 2.4.1
Acquirer Name Target Name Announcement Date Effective Date
Wells Fargo & Co. Benson Associates, LLC 26-Aug-03 26-Aug-03
Bank of America Corporation Fleet Boston Corporation 27-Oct-03 1-Apr-04
Wells Fargo & Co. Strong Financial Corp. 26-May-04 3-Jan-05
Transamerica Invt Mgmt WestCap Investors, LLC 19-May-05 4-Aug-05
J.P Morgan Chase & Co. BNY-Consumer Business 31-Mar-06 2-Oct-06
Morgan Stanley Group Inc FrontPoint Partners, L.L.C. 31-Oct-06 4-Dec-06
Bank of NY Trust Co Mellon Bank 3-Dec-06 2-Jul-07
RiverSource Investments J. & W. Seligman & Co., Inc. 7-Jul-08 7-Nov-08
Bank of America Corporation Merrill Lynch & Co Inc. 14-Sep-08 1-Jan-09
Barclays Bank PLC Lehman Brothers Inc. 16-Sep-08 22-Sep-08
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B.2 List of Mutual Funds Implicated in Scandal
This appendix gives the names of the 20 mutual fund families that were implicated and eventually negotiated settle-



















19. Strong Capital Management
20. Waddell & Reed
61
APPENDIX C
TABLES FOR SECTION 2
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Table C.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the entire sample. Panel A presents the summary
statistics for industry-adjusted dependent variables, similarity measures, and common ownership
measures. Panel B reports the summary statistics for the control variables and other firm charac-
teristics. Variable definitions are in Appendix A.1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the
1st and the 99th percentile.
Panel A: Summary statistics for the dependent variables, similarity and common ownership mea-
sures
P25 Mean Median P75 Std. Dev.
Dependent Variables(SIC)
Ind. Adj. Gross Margin -0.06 0.06 0.04 0.23 2.04
Ind. Adj. R&D to Sale -0.08 -0.10 -0.00 0.00 0.25
Ind. Adj. EBITDA to Sales Ratio -0.02 0.13 0.06 0.49 3.26
Ind. Adj. NI to Sales Ratio -0.01 0.14 0.07 0.59 3.74
Dependent Variables(FIC)
Ind. Adj. Gross Margin -0.07 0.04 0.03 0.20 2.15
Ind. Adj. R&D to Sale -0.04 -0.07 -0.00 0.00 0.21
Ind. Adj. EBITDA to Sales Ratio -0.03 0.10 0.05 0.34 3.36
Ind. Adj. NI to Sales Ratio -0.01 0.13 0.05 0.39 3.73
Similarity Score
ATSIM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ATSIM-SIC 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03
ATSIM-FIC 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03
Common Ownership Measures
Pct. shares held by CO investors (SIC) 0.00 0.13 0.07 0.21 0.16
Pct. shares held by CO investors (FIC) 0.00 0.14 0.08 0.23 0.17
PropPeer under CO (SIC) 0.00 0.21 0.11 0.35 0.24
PropPeer under CO (FIC) 0.00 0.21 0.12 0.38 0.24
NumMgnr(SIC) 0.00 4.71 1.00 3.25 11.43
NumMgnr(FIC) 0.00 5.38 1.00 3.50 13.04
Number of observations 59987
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Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the control variables and other firm characteristics
P25 Mean Median P75 Std. Dev.
Control Variables
Total Assets (billion) 0.06 2.82 0.25 1.10 17.45
Log Assets 4.09 5.61 5.51 7.01 2.04
Market to Book 0.86 2.00 1.29 2.17 2.88
Log Market to Book -0.15 0.35 0.25 0.77 0.72
Cash to Assets 0.03 0.21 0.12 0.32 0.24
Advertising to Assets 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03
R&D to Assets 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.12
Leverage Ratio 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.28 0.20
Pct share held by inst.inv. 0.14 0.42 0.41 0.69 0.30
HHI (SIC) 0.13 0.27 0.21 0.36 0.19
HHI (FIC) 0.12 0.26 0.19 0.33 0.19
Num. of Firms in Industry (SIC) 9.00 48.76 19.00 65.00 64.20
Num. of Firms in Industry (FIC) 12.00 56.47 31.00 66.00 71.05
Other Firm Characteristics
CO Dummy(SIC) 0.00 0.68 1.00 1.00 0.47
CO Dummy(FIC) 0.00 0.68 1.00 1.00 0.47
Pct share held by blockholders 0.01 0.14 0.11 0.22 0.14
Number of observations 59987
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Table C.2: Ind. Adj. Gross Margin
This table presents the results for the effect of common ownership and product similarity on price
levels. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted gross margin. It is defined as (sales - cost of
goods sold) / sales and is adjusted for the mean industry gross margin, where industry is defined
using the 4-digit SIC code in Panel A and the FIC400 code in Panel B. Common ownership is
measured as the total number of shares owned by institutional investors who hold at least one
other industry peer (ComOwn) in columns 1 and 4, proportion of peers connected to a given firm
(PropPeer) in columns 2 and 5, and number of common owners (NumMgnr) in columns 3 and
6. Product similarity is averaged over all firms (ATSIM) in columns (1)-(3) and over firms within
the industry (ATSIM-SIC in Panel A and ATSIM-FIC in Panel B) in columns (4)-(6). Variable
definitions are in Appendix A.1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th
percentile. Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-values are in parentheses. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Dependent variable: Industry-Adjusted Gross Margin, where industry is defined
using 4-digit SIC code
ATSIM ATSIM-SIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ComOwn 0.032** 0.036**
(0.046) (0.044)








NumMgnr x ATSIM 0.066** 0.046***
(0.017) (0.004)
ATSIM 0.057 0.099 0.071 0.007 0.002 0.009
(0.504) (0.224) (0.404) (0.821) (0.950) (0.771)
Log Assets 0.011 0.011 0.004 0.018 0.022 0.014
(0.723) (0.707) (0.887) (0.553) (0.460) (0.652)
Log Market to Book 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.083*** 0.086*** 0.089*** 0.083***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Cash to Assets -1.015*** -1.011*** -1.009*** -1.014*** -1.018*** -1.011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Advertising to Assets 0.629 0.621 0.646 0.645 0.629 0.646
(0.187) (0.193) (0.177) (0.177) (0.189) (0.177)
R&D to Assets -1.566*** -1.558*** -1.571*** -1.568*** -1.564*** -1.567***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Leverage Ratio 0.194 0.194 0.217* 0.213* 0.207 0.227*
(0.126) (0.127) (0.092) (0.098) (0.107) (0.078)
Pct share held by inst.inv. -0.118* -0.088 -0.039 -0.112* -0.019 -0.045
(0.078) (0.170) (0.527) (0.093) (0.772) (0.472)
HHI 0.174* 0.179* 0.177* 0.185* 0.183* 0.194**
(0.069) (0.062) (0.066) (0.059) (0.063) (0.049)
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Log(1+num firms in the industry) 0.119** 0.122** 0.123** 0.135*** 0.142*** 0.141***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
N 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B. Dependent variable: Industry-Adjusted Gross Margin, where industry is defined using
FIC400 code
ATSIM ATSIM-FIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ComOwn 0.016 0.022
(0.351) (0.234)








NumMgnr x ATSIM 0.102∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.007)
ATSIM 0.045 0.088 0.054 -0.044 -0.046∗ -0.042
(0.616) (0.300) (0.543) (0.106) (0.096) (0.119)
Log Assets 0.006 0.005 -0.002 0.015 0.017 0.010
(0.831) (0.871) (0.955) (0.618) (0.551) (0.746)
Log Market to Book 0.087∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Cash to Assets -0.920∗∗∗ -0.915∗∗∗ -0.906∗∗∗ -0.913∗∗∗ -0.915∗∗∗ -0.907∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Advertising to Assets 0.396 0.395 0.438 0.433 0.425 0.444
(0.408) (0.410) (0.362) (0.370) (0.380) (0.357)
R&D to Assets -1.699∗∗∗ -1.692∗∗∗ -1.694∗∗∗ -1.686∗∗∗ -1.683∗∗∗ -1.686∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Leverage Ratio 0.163 0.165 0.187 0.180 0.175 0.195
(0.198) (0.194) (0.144) (0.159) (0.170) (0.127)
Pct share held by inst.inv. -0.113∗ -0.109∗ -0.065 -0.111∗ -0.051 -0.069
(0.089) (0.095) (0.283) (0.095) (0.446) (0.255)
HHI 0.232∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(1+num firms in the industry) 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table C.3: Ind. Adj. R&D to sales ratio
This table presents the results for the effect of common ownership and product similarity on R&D
expenditure. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted R&D to sales ratio. It is defined as the
firm’s R&D expenditure divided by total sales and is adjusted for the mean industry R&D to sales
ratio, where industry is defined using the 4-digit SIC code in Panel A and the FIC400 code in
Panel B. Common ownership is measured as the total number of shares owned by institutional
investors who hold at least one other industry peer (ComOwn) in columns 1 and 4, proportion of
peers connected to a given firm (PropPeer) in columns 2 and 5, and number of common owners
(NumMgnr) in columns 3 and 6. Product similarity is averaged over all firms (ATSIM) in columns
(1)-(3) and over firms within the industry (ATSIM-SIC in Panel A and ATSIM-FIC in Panel
B) in columns (4)-(6). Variable definitions are in Appendix A.1. All continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile. Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-values are in
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Dependent variable: Industry-Adjusted R&D to sales ratio, where industry is de-
fined using 4-digit SIC code
ATSIM ATSIM-SIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ComOwn -0.003 -0.003
(0.148) (0.172)








NumMgnr x ATSIM -0.005** -0.004***
(0.016) (0.004)
ATSIM -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.517) (0.722) (0.467)
Log Assets 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.018) (0.026) (0.010)
Log Market to Book -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash to Assets 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.127***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Advertising to Assets -0.113* -0.112* -0.114* -0.116* -0.115* -0.116*
(0.060) (0.062) (0.058) (0.053) (0.056) (0.053)
R&D to Assets 0.325*** 0.325*** 0.325*** 0.322*** 0.322*** 0.322***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage Ratio -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 -0.016
(0.237) (0.239) (0.164) (0.166) (0.180) (0.118)
Pct share held by inst.inv. 0.003 -0.000 -0.002 0.004 -0.004 -0.001
(0.597) (0.980) (0.739) (0.584) (0.539) (0.827)
HHI -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.057***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Log(1+num firms in the industry) -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B. Dependent variable: Industry-Adjusted R&D to sales ratio, where industry is defined
using FIC400 code
ATSIM ATSIM-FIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ComOwn -0.001 -0.002
(0.634) (0.372)








NumMgnr x ATSIM -0.010∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.000) (0.031)
ATSIM -0.013∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.272) (0.283) (0.300)
Log Assets 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.004∗ 0.004∗
(0.015) (0.012) (0.009) (0.074) (0.087) (0.066)
Log Market to Book -0.017∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash to Assets 0.114∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Advertising to Assets -0.048 -0.048 -0.052 -0.053 -0.052 -0.053
(0.431) (0.431) (0.391) (0.388) (0.397) (0.382)
R&D to Assets 0.298∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage Ratio -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015
(0.209) (0.198) (0.163) (0.127) (0.136) (0.116)
Pct share held by inst.inv. 0.009 0.010∗ 0.004 0.009 0.003 0.005
(0.183) (0.097) (0.435) (0.179) (0.578) (0.387)
HHI -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(1+num firms in the industry) -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table C.4: Ind. Adj. EBITDA to sales ratio
This table presents the results for the effect of common ownership and product similarity on
EBITDA to SALE ratio. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted EBITDA to sales ratio. It is
defined as the firm’s EBITDA divided by its sales and is adjusted for the mean industry EBITDA
to sales ratio, where industry is defined using the 4-digit SIC code in Panel A and the FIC400 code
in Panel B. Common ownership is measured as the total number of shares owned by institutional
investors who hold at least one other industry peer (ComOwn) in columns 1 and 4, proportion of
peers connected to a given firm (PropPeer) in columns 2 and 5, and number of common owners
(NumMgnr) in columns 3 and 6. Product similarity is averaged over all firms (ATSIM) in columns
(1)-(3) and over firms within the industry (ATSIM-SIC in Panel A and ATSIM-FIC in Panel
B) in columns (4)-(6). Variable definitions are in Appendix A.1. All continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile. Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-values are in
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Dependent variable: Industry-Adjusted EBITDA to sales ratio, where industry is
defined using 4-digit SIC code
ATSIM ATSIM-SIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ComOwn 0.042 0.049*
(0.110) (0.078)








NumMgnr x ATSIM 0.101*** 0.063***
(0.008) (0.006)
ATSIM 0.002 0.073 0.028 -0.014 -0.021 -0.011
(0.987) (0.551) (0.829) (0.772) (0.673) (0.823)
Log Assets 0.045 0.046 0.037 0.049 0.056 0.045
(0.355) (0.346) (0.453) (0.305) (0.243) (0.356)
Log Market to Book 0.148*** 0.150*** 0.145*** 0.147*** 0.152*** 0.144***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
Cash to Assets -2.199*** -2.191*** -2.193*** -2.208*** -2.214*** -2.205***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Advertising to Assets 1.187 1.172 1.214 1.194 1.168 1.195
(0.170) (0.177) (0.162) (0.168) (0.178) (0.168)
R&D to Assets -2.253*** -2.238*** -2.264*** -2.279*** -2.272*** -2.277***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Leverage Ratio 0.226 0.225 0.258 0.249 0.240 0.266
(0.236) (0.237) (0.182) (0.197) (0.214) (0.170)
Pct share held by inst.inv. -0.065 -0.026 0.054 -0.051 0.094 0.048
(0.536) (0.797) (0.576) (0.625) (0.353) (0.614)
HHI 0.454*** 0.462*** 0.458*** 0.462*** 0.458*** 0.474***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
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Log(1+num firms in the industry) 0.268*** 0.269*** 0.274*** 0.278*** 0.285*** 0.286***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
N 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B. Dependent variable: Industry-Adjusted EBITDA to sales ratio, where industry is defined
using FIC400 code
ATSIM ATSIM-FIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ComOwn 0.024 0.037
(0.395) (0.215)








NumMgnr x ATSIM 0.160∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗
(0.000) (0.013)
ATSIM 0.037 0.119 0.058 -0.077∗ -0.081∗ -0.074∗
(0.783) (0.347) (0.663) (0.069) (0.064) (0.079)
Log Assets 0.026 0.021 0.016 0.036 0.040 0.032
(0.592) (0.654) (0.737) (0.438) (0.389) (0.498)
Log Market to Book 0.140∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Cash to Assets -2.054∗∗∗ -2.041∗∗∗ -2.039∗∗∗ -2.047∗∗∗ -2.050∗∗∗ -2.042∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Advertising to Assets 0.860 0.861 0.924 0.911 0.901 0.922
(0.318) (0.318) (0.283) (0.293) (0.299) (0.286)
R&D to Assets -2.390∗∗∗ -2.376∗∗∗ -2.387∗∗∗ -2.383∗∗∗ -2.380∗∗∗ -2.381∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Leverage Ratio 0.254 0.259 0.285 0.280 0.275 0.295
(0.176) (0.167) (0.133) (0.139) (0.147) (0.121)
Pct share held by inst.inv. -0.087 -0.121 0.004 -0.080 0.000 -0.000
(0.381) (0.236) (0.967) (0.424) (0.997) (1.000)
HHI 0.380∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(1+num firms in the industry) 0.196∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table C.5: Ind. Adj. NI to sales ratio
This table presents the results for the effect of common ownership and product similarity on net
income. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted NI to sales ratio. It is defined as the firm’s
net income divided by total sales and is adjusted for the mean industry NI/SALE, where industry
is defined using the 4-digit SIC code in Panel A and the FIC400 code in Panel B. Common
ownership is measured as the total number of shares owned by institutional investors who hold
at least one other industry peer (ComOwn) in columns 1 and 4, proportion of peers connected
to a given firm (PropPeer) in columns 2 and 5, and number of common owners (NumMgnr) in
columns 3 and 6.Product similarity is averaged over all firms (ATSIM) in columns (1)-(3) and over
firms within the industry (ATSIM-SIC in Panel A and ATSIM-FIC in Panel B) in columns (4)-(6).
Variable definitions are in Appendix A.1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and
the 99th percentile. Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-values are in parentheses. *, ** and
*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Dependent variable: Industry-Adjusted NI to sales ratio, where industry is defined
using 4-digit SIC code
ATSIM ATSIM-SIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ComOwn 0.040 0.048
(0.183) (0.136)








NumMgnr x ATSIM 0.105** 0.080***
(0.016) (0.003)
ATSIM 0.042 0.118 0.072 0.001 -0.006 0.004
(0.777) (0.401) (0.629) (0.985) (0.921) (0.941)
Log Assets -0.057 -0.057 -0.058 -0.050 -0.044 -0.047
(0.321) (0.320) (0.323) (0.377) (0.440) (0.420)
Log Market to Book 0.216*** 0.218*** 0.219*** 0.215*** 0.220*** 0.219***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash to Assets -1.984*** -1.976*** -1.987*** -1.990*** -1.996*** -1.995***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Advertising to Assets 1.428 1.413 1.457 1.444 1.417 1.450
(0.141) (0.146) (0.133) (0.137) (0.144) (0.135)
R&D to Assets -2.634*** -2.620*** -2.643*** -2.654*** -2.647*** -2.646***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Leverage Ratio 0.263 0.263 0.281 0.291 0.281 0.294
(0.241) (0.241) (0.215) (0.200) (0.215) (0.196)
Pct share held by inst.inv. -0.011 0.028 0.131 0.002 0.154 0.124
(0.928) (0.807) (0.227) (0.984) (0.179) (0.253)
HHI 0.390** 0.399** 0.388** 0.405** 0.401** 0.409**
(0.023) (0.020) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019)
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Log(1+num firms in the industry) 0.293*** 0.293*** 0.302*** 0.311*** 0.318*** 0.324***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B. Dependent variable: Industry-Adjusted NI to sales ratio, where industry is defined using
FIC400 code
ATSIM ATSIM-FIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ComOwn 0.020 0.035
(0.522) (0.303)








NumMgnr x ATSIM 0.164∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.000) (0.038)
ATSIM 0.073 0.158 0.096 -0.073 -0.077 -0.070
(0.636) (0.274) (0.527) (0.134) (0.128) (0.149)
Log Assets -0.079 -0.084 -0.085 -0.066 -0.062 -0.065
(0.163) (0.136) (0.143) (0.239) (0.263) (0.250)
Log Market to Book 0.210∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash to Assets -1.820∗∗∗ -1.806∗∗∗ -1.809∗∗∗ -1.809∗∗∗ -1.811∗∗∗ -1.810∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Advertising to Assets 1.158 1.159 1.224 1.218 1.206 1.227
(0.224) (0.224) (0.199) (0.204) (0.208) (0.200)
R&D to Assets -2.823∗∗∗ -2.811∗∗∗ -2.818∗∗∗ -2.808∗∗∗ -2.805∗∗∗ -2.804∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Leverage Ratio 0.274 0.280 0.296 0.305 0.299 0.309
(0.212) (0.203) (0.182) (0.170) (0.178) (0.166)
Pct share held by inst.inv. -0.037 -0.075 0.065 -0.030 0.050 0.061
(0.742) (0.514) (0.532) (0.790) (0.661) (0.560)
HHI 0.434∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(1+num firms in the industry) 0.234∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table C.6: M&A of Financial Institutions
This table reports the results for the difference-in-differences analysis using the M&A of financial
institutions as an exogenous shock to a firm’s common ownership level. Treated firm is a firm in
the portfolio of target or acquirer that experienced an increase in common ownership post M&A.
Control firm is a firm in the portfolio of either target or acquirer that did not experience a change
in its common ownership levels post acquisition. Panel A reports the results of whether the M&A
of financial institutions affect common ownership levels of portfolio firms. Panel B presents the
results for the industry-adjusted gross margin. Panel C, D and E presents the results for R&D ratio,
EBITDA to sales ratio, and NI to sales ratio, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix
A.1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile. Standard errors
are clustered by firm. p-values are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at
10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Does M&A of financial institutions affect Common Ownership?
CODummy LnNumPeers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated=1 x Post=1 0.088∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Post=1 -0.216∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Treated=1 0.000 0.017 0.000 -0.155∗∗∗
(.) (0.563) (.) (0.000)
Log Assets -0.100∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log Market to Book -0.098∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash to Assets -0.056 -0.067 0.084 -0.039
(0.502) (0.395) (0.612) (0.788)
Advertising to Assets -1.317∗∗ -1.725∗∗∗ -0.902 -0.971
(0.013) (0.001) (0.400) (0.281)
R&D to Assets 0.126 0.075 0.035 0.187
(0.566) (0.732) (0.942) (0.734)
Leverage Ratio 0.128∗∗ 0.088 0.264∗∗ 0.140
(0.042) (0.146) (0.031) (0.217)
Pct. share held by inst.inv. 0.053 0.058 0.079 0.071
(0.340) (0.262) (0.430) (0.441)
HHI 0.023 -0.028 0.005 -0.235∗∗
(0.847) (0.779) (0.978) (0.046)
Num. of firms in the industry -0.018 -0.007 -0.084 -0.058
(0.606) (0.838) (0.119) (0.219)
N 15337 15337 15337 15337
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.54 0.84 0.75
Deal x Firm FE Yes No Yes No
Deal FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B. Does the effect of Common Ownership on Ind. Adj. Gross Margin vary?
SIC FIC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x Treated x ATSIM 0.082∗ 0.075∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.031∗∗
(0.054) (0.065) (0.033) (0.031)
Post 0.007 0.009 0.003 0.003
(0.574) (0.488) (0.722) (0.689)
Treated 0.000 -0.016 0.000 0.005
(.) (0.212) (.) (0.547)
Post x Treated 0.046 0.048 0.004 0.005
(0.172) (0.154) (0.785) (0.672)
Post x ATSIM -0.001 -0.002 -0.013∗∗ -0.012∗∗
(0.791) (0.695) (0.020) (0.024)
Treated x ATSIM 0.076 -0.040∗∗ 0.025 -0.013
(0.101) (0.016) (0.231) (0.105)
ATSIM -0.002 0.009 0.003 0.007
(0.827) (0.274) (0.701) (0.319)
Log Assets 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.008
(0.705) (0.651) (0.697) (0.502)
Log Market to Book 0.038∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003)
Cash to Assets -0.112 -0.056 0.048 0.052
(0.123) (0.375) (0.316) (0.221)
Advertising to Assets 0.229 0.207 -0.401 -0.454
(0.500) (0.461) (0.276) (0.221)
R&D to Assets -0.265 -0.179 0.039 0.043
(0.338) (0.444) (0.770) (0.683)
Leverage Ratio 0.048 0.022 0.057∗ 0.027
(0.409) (0.660) (0.099) (0.409)
Pct. share held by inst.inv. -0.038 -0.053∗ -0.020 -0.042
(0.282) (0.097) (0.507) (0.165)
HHI 0.147∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ -0.025 -0.014
(0.043) (0.009) (0.332) (0.523)
Num. of firms in the industry 0.068∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.011) (0.031) (0.010)
N 15337 15337 15337 15337
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.89 0.68 0.69
Deal x Firm FE Yes No Yes No
Deal FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel C. Does the effect of Common Ownership on Ind. Adj. R&D to sales ratio vary?
SIC FIC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x Treated x ATSIM -0.018∗ -0.017∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗∗
(0.056) (0.053) (0.020) (0.016)
Post 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.001
(0.450) (0.332) (0.541) (0.440)
Treated 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.001
(.) (0.176) (.) (0.576)
Post x Treated 0.004 0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.666) (0.722) (0.510) (0.544)
Post x ATSIM -0.003 -0.002 0.001∗ 0.001∗
(0.341) (0.528) (0.098) (0.095)
Treated x ATSIM -0.001 0.009 0.000 0.004∗∗
(0.916) (0.133) (0.999) (0.038)
ATSIM -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.994) (0.734) (0.622) (0.981)
Log Assets -0.006 -0.010 -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.337) (0.107) (0.004) (0.003)
Log Market to Book -0.019∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001
(0.011) (0.004) (0.877) (0.724)
Cash to Assets 0.121∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.010 0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.332) (0.375)
Advertising to Assets -0.312 -0.224 0.054 0.058
(0.174) (0.215) (0.515) (0.454)
R&D to Assets 0.174 0.091 0.099∗∗ 0.062
(0.134) (0.356) (0.043) (0.158)
Leverage Ratio -0.012 -0.015 -0.010∗ -0.010∗∗
(0.577) (0.448) (0.059) (0.048)
Pct. share held by inst.inv. 0.019 0.023 0.008∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.284) (0.144) (0.078) (0.043)
HHI -0.042 -0.039 -0.015∗∗ -0.012∗∗
(0.195) (0.148) (0.018) (0.031)
Num. of firms in the industry -0.016 -0.016 -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.116) (0.003) (0.005)
N 15337 15337 15337 15337
Adjusted R2 0.76 0.77 0.65 0.66
Deal x Firm FE Yes No Yes No
Deal FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel D. Does the effect of Common Ownership on Ind. Adj. EBITDA to sales ratio vary?
SIC FIC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x Treated x ATSIM 0.144∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.065∗∗
(0.021) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010)
Post 0.042 0.037 0.032∗ 0.029∗
(0.107) (0.129) (0.052) (0.070)
Treated 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.041∗∗∗
(.) (0.905) (.) (0.008)
Post x Treated 0.018 0.028 -0.037 -0.025
(0.687) (0.533) (0.115) (0.256)
Post x ATSIM -0.010 -0.014 -0.035∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(0.416) (0.235) (0.001) (0.001)
Treated x ATSIM 0.085 -0.084∗∗∗ 0.075 -0.029∗
(0.368) (0.001) (0.106) (0.054)
ATSIM -0.044 -0.016 0.001 0.009
(0.169) (0.530) (0.939) (0.537)
Log Assets -0.042 -0.027 -0.027 -0.017
(0.156) (0.318) (0.234) (0.437)
Log Market to Book 0.093∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.001) (0.015) (0.004)
Cash to Assets -0.336∗ -0.181 -0.064 -0.044
(0.058) (0.298) (0.473) (0.578)
Advertising to Assets -0.087 -0.226 -1.053 -1.043
(0.912) (0.717) (0.113) (0.106)
R&D to Assets -0.828 -0.605 -0.328 -0.243
(0.103) (0.167) (0.275) (0.305)
Leverage Ratio 0.089 0.060 0.074 0.044
(0.414) (0.534) (0.266) (0.457)
Pct. share held by inst.inv. -0.066 -0.100 -0.136∗∗ -0.173∗∗
(0.431) (0.191) (0.039) (0.013)
HHI 0.255∗ 0.296∗∗ 0.037 0.026
(0.096) (0.022) (0.542) (0.546)
Num. of firms in the industry 0.129∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001)
N 15337 15337 15337 15337
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.85 0.67 0.69
Deal x Firm FE Yes No Yes No
Deal FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel E. Does the effect of Common Ownership on Ind. Adj. NI to sales ratio vary?
SIC FIC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post x Treated x ATSIM 0.186∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.076∗∗
(0.007) (0.004) (0.015) (0.011)
Post 0.068∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.044∗∗
(0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024)
Treated 0.000 0.060∗∗ 0.000 0.080∗∗∗
(.) (0.031) (.) (0.000)
Post x Treated -0.041 -0.028 -0.082∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗
(0.438) (0.592) (0.004) (0.016)
Post x ATSIM -0.015 -0.019 -0.046∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(0.264) (0.130) (0.000) (0.000)
Treated x ATSIM 0.050 -0.122∗∗∗ 0.097∗ -0.027
(0.649) (0.000) (0.068) (0.161)
ATSIM -0.048 -0.015 -0.003 0.009
(0.183) (0.597) (0.890) (0.601)
Log Assets -0.052 -0.033 -0.034 -0.018
(0.107) (0.285) (0.190) (0.448)
Log Market to Book 0.099∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Cash to Assets -0.298 -0.097 -0.086 -0.042
(0.126) (0.614) (0.462) (0.702)
Advertising to Assets 0.275 0.090 -1.249∗ -1.180∗
(0.773) (0.906) (0.094) (0.092)
R&D to Assets -1.100∗ -0.801 -0.482 -0.349
(0.052) (0.104) (0.172) (0.221)
Leverage Ratio 0.094 0.065 0.077 0.057
(0.427) (0.537) (0.344) (0.419)
Pct. share held by inst.inv. -0.123 -0.170∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.254∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.062) (0.008) (0.002)
HHI 0.303∗ 0.352∗∗ 0.037 0.027
(0.080) (0.016) (0.598) (0.592)
Num. of firms in the industry 0.160∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
N 15337 15337 15337 15337
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.84 0.66 0.67
Deal x Firm FE Yes No Yes No
Deal FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table C.7: Mutual Fund Scandal
This table presents the 2SLS estimates. Panel A presents the results for the first stage. It also
presents the second stage for industry-adjusted gross margin. Industry is defined using the 4-digit
SIC code in columns (1)-(3) and the FIC400 code in columns (4)-(6). Panel B presents the
results for industry-adjusted R&D to sales ratio, industry-adjusted EBITDA to sales ratio and
industry-adjusted net income to sales ratio. Industry is defined using the 4-digit SIC code in
columns (1)-(3) and the FIC400 code in columns (4)-(6). Variable definitions are in Appendix
A.1. To conserve space, the variable names in Panel A are shortened: SCO (ScandalComOwn),
CO(ComOwn). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile.
Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-values are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: 2SLS estimation results for Ind. Adj. Gross Margin
1st Stage 2nd Stage(SIC) 1st Stage 2nd Stage(FIC)
CO CO x ATSIM CO CO x ATSIM
CO -0.598 -0.198
(0.216) (0.600)
CO x ATSIM 0.401** 0.287*
(0.046) (0.060)
SCO -0.086***-0.087*** -0.086***-0.058*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.081)
SCO x ATSIM -0.016* 0.225*** -0.017* 0.284***
(0.089) (0.000) (0.094) (0.000)
ATSIM 0.047*** 0.156*** -0.062 0.072*** 0.189*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.207) (0.000) (0.000) (0.983)
Log Assets -0.055***-0.050*** -0.099*** -0.066***-0.067*** -0.076***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log Market to Book -0.075***0.006 -0.086 -0.079***-0.016 -0.135*
(0.000) (0.822) (0.254) (0.000) (0.583) (0.067)
Cash to Assets -0.119** 0.061 -0.578** -0.248***0.124 -0.375
(0.012) (0.435) (0.016) (0.000) (0.147) (0.172)
Advertising to Assets -0.753***-0.481 -1.071 -0.738***-0.172 -1.829***
(0.005) (0.213) (0.167) (0.005) (0.730) (0.004)
R&D to Assets 0.113 -0.559*** -2.760*** -0.008 -0.733*** -1.860**
(0.219) (0.001) (0.000) (0.925) (0.000) (0.023)
Leverage Ratio -0.137***0.234** -0.040 -0.131** 0.155 0.156
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(0.009) (0.026) (0.870) (0.011) (0.179) (0.496)
%share held by inst.inv. 1.434*** 0.219*** 0.928 1.486*** 0.297*** 0.402
(0.000) (0.005) (0.161) (0.000) (0.000) (0.444)
HHI -1.008***0.314*** -1.069* -0.976***0.533*** -1.006**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.055) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029)
Log(1+#firms in ind.) -0.049***0.027* 0.017 -0.033***0.038** 0.019
(0.000) (0.066) (0.686) (0.000) (0.021) (0.599)
GrossMargin(2003) -0.082** 0.066 1.890*** -0.090***0.069 1.918***
(0.028) (0.376) (0.000) (0.010) (0.374) (0.000)
ComOwn(2003) 3.925*** 1.014*** 2.645 3.704*** 0.862*** 1.028
(0.000) (0.000) (0.109) (0.000) (0.000) (0.400)
N 8166 8166 8166 8166 8166 8166
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.07
Year FE Yes Yes
1st Stage Test Statistics
Sanderson-Windmeijer 85 47 96 59
2nd Stage Test Statistics
KPF-stat 46.72 42.66
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Panel B: 2SLS estimation results for Ind. Adj. R&D to sales ratio, EBITDA to sales ratio, and net
income to sales ratio
SIC FIC
R&D/SALE EBIDTA/SALE NI/SALE R&D/SALE EBIDTA/SALE NI/SALE
ComOwn 0.063 -1.210∗∗ -1.383∗∗ -0.064 -0.512 -0.482
(0.255) (0.012) (0.011) (0.110) (0.208) (0.269)
ComOwn x ATSIM -0.040∗∗ 0.490∗∗ 0.570∗∗ -0.022∗ 0.368∗∗ 0.410∗∗
(0.040) (0.019) (0.016) (0.087) (0.030) (0.025)
ATSIM 0.016∗∗∗ -0.065 -0.067 0.004 0.095∗ 0.107∗∗
(0.000) (0.215) (0.265) (0.410) (0.057) (0.049)
Log Assets 0.014∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.074∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.616) (0.004) (0.008)
Log Market to Book -0.043∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ -0.289∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.020) (0.010) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005)
Cash to Assets 0.150∗∗∗ -1.584∗∗∗ -1.469∗∗∗ 0.016 -1.179∗∗∗ -0.925∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.507) (0.001) (0.013)
Advertising to Assets 0.242∗ -2.728∗∗∗ -2.810∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗ -3.401∗∗∗ -3.400∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D to Assets 0.337∗∗∗ -3.076∗∗∗ -3.640∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ -1.296 -1.606
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.031) (0.191) (0.147)
Leverage Ratio 0.064∗∗ -0.263 -0.539 0.000 0.035 -0.146
(0.020) (0.340) (0.103) (0.991) (0.898) (0.642)
Pct share held by inst.inv. -0.104 2.190∗∗∗ 2.415∗∗∗ 0.113∗ 1.183∗∗ 1.143∗
(0.191) (0.001) (0.001) (0.058) (0.036) (0.059)
HHI 0.088 -2.014∗∗∗ -2.309∗∗∗ 0.046 -1.637∗∗∗ -1.689∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.000) (0.000) (0.255) (0.001) (0.002)
Log(1+num firms in the industry) -0.054∗∗∗ 0.068 0.058 -0.025∗∗∗ 0.020 0.023
(0.000) (0.160) (0.298) (0.000) (0.645) (0.619)
GrossMargin(2003) -0.039∗ 2.203∗∗∗ 2.484∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ 2.274∗∗∗ 2.420∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ComOwn(2003) -0.310 4.947∗∗∗ 5.596∗∗∗ 0.162 2.076 2.009
(0.128) (0.003) (0.003) (0.242) (0.115) (0.156)
N 8166 8166 8166 8166 8166 8166
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.04 0.04
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
KPF-stat 30.74 99.56 99.56 38.69 89.83 89.83
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Table C.8: Industry Quartile Analysis
This table presents the results for the hypothesis that the effects of common ownership are
concentrated in firms belonging to industries with high product similarity. The dependent variable
is Gross Margin in panel A, R&D to sales ratio in panel B, EBITDA to sales ratio in panel C, and
net income to sales ratio in panel D. All dependent variables are industry-adjusted, where industry
is defined using 4-digit SIC code in columns (1)-(3) and the FIC400 code in columns (4)-(6).
Common ownership is equal to a firm’s common ownership level if the firm belongs to an industry
in the jth quartile of similarity, 0 otherwise. It is measured as the total numbers of shares owned
by institutional investors that holds at least one other industry peer (ComOwn) in columns 1 and
4, proportion of peers connected to a given firm (PropPeer) in columns 2 and 5, and number of
common owners (NumMgnr) in columns 3 and 6. The regression includes all firm level control
variables used in panel regressions. Variable definitions are in Appendix A.1. All continuous
variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are clustered by firm. p-values
are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A. Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted Gross Margin
SIC FIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 1 -0.006∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.009) (0.415)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 2 -0.003 -0.008∗∗∗
(0.356) (0.001)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 3 0.016∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.000) (0.423)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 4 0.037∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.007)
PropPeer Similarity Quartile 1 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.003∗
(0.000) (0.095)
PropPeer Similarity Quartile 2 -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.001)
PropPeer Similarity Quartile 3 0.008∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.008) (0.389)
PropPeer Similarity Quartile 4 0.027∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
NumMgnr Similarity Quartile 1 -0.003 0.002
(0.232) (0.436)
NumMgnr Similarity Quartile 2 -0.005∗ -0.004
(0.055) (0.147)
NumMgnr Similarity Quartile 3 0.009∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.006) (0.150)
NumMgnr Similarity Quartile 4 0.021∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
N 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.59 0.59 0.59
Control Var Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value(4-1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
85
Panel B. Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted R&D to sales ratio
SIC FIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 1 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.000) (0.516)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 2 0.002∗ 0.001
(0.100) (0.304)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 3 -0.006∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.017)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 4 -0.016∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
PropPeer Similarity Quartile 1 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.000) (0.017)
PropPeer Similarity Quartile 2 0.003∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.011) (0.032)
PropPeer Similarity Quartile 3 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.008) (0.156)
PropPeer Similarity Quartile 4 -0.012∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
NumMgnr Similarity Quartile 1 0.006∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.000) (0.016)
NumMgnr Similarity Quartile 2 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.006) (0.215)
NumMgnr Similarity Quartile 3 -0.004∗∗ -0.001
(0.012) (0.452)
NumMgnr Similarity Quartile 4 -0.012∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002)
N 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.50 0.50 0.50
Control Var Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value(4-1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Panel C. Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted EBITDA to sales ratio
SIC FIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 1 -0.013 -0.003
(0.213) (0.759)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 2 -0.004 -0.004
(0.755) (0.756)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 3 0.032∗ 0.021
(0.070) (0.238)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 4 0.130∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗
(0.000) (0.010)
PropPeer Similarity Quartile 1 -0.033∗∗∗ -0.014
(0.001) (0.183)
PropPeer Similarity Quartile 2 -0.025∗∗ -0.012
(0.019) (0.267)
PropPeer Similarity Quartile 3 -0.002 0.006
(0.890) (0.604)
PropPeer Similarity Quartile 4 0.090∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001)
NumMgnr Similarity Quartile 1 -0.004 -0.007
(0.730) (0.451)
NumMgnr Similarity Quartile 2 -0.012 -0.009
(0.244) (0.403)
NumMgnr Similarity Quartile 3 0.015 0.012
(0.225) (0.322)
NumMgnr Similarity Quartile 4 0.059∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗
(0.003) (0.012)
N 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.47
Control Var Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value(4-1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Panel D. Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted NI to sales ratio
SIC FIC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 1 -0.016∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.003) (0.194)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 2 -0.017∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 3 0.029∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.000) (0.558)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 4 0.050∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.005)
PropPeer Similarity Quartile 1 -0.022∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.000) (0.234)
PropPeer Similarity Quartile 2 -0.020∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗
(0.000) (0.020)
PropPeer Similarity Quartile 3 0.013∗∗ 0.009
(0.019) (0.110)
PropPeer Similarity Quartile 4 0.037∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
NumMgnr Similarity Quartile 1 -0.012∗ -0.010
(0.063) (0.162)
NumMgnr Similarity Quartile 2 -0.021∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.000) (0.024)
NumMgnr Similarity Quartile 3 0.016∗∗ 0.003
(0.030) (0.623)
NumMgnr Similarity Quartile 4 0.026∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000)
N 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987 59987
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.57 0.57 0.57
Control Var Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value(4-1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table C.9: Industry Quartile Analysis – M&A of Financial Institutions
This table reports the results for the difference-in-differences estimation using the M&A of fi-
nancial institutions as an exogenous shock to a firm’s common ownership level. The dependent
variable is Gross Margin in column 1, R&D to asset ratio in column 2, EBITDA to sales ratio in
column 3, and net income to sales ratio in column 4. Treated firm is a firm in the portfolio of target
or acquirer that experienced an increase in common ownership post M&A. Control firm is a firm in
the portfolio of either target or acquirer that did not experience a change in its common ownership
levels post acquisition. Similarity quartile j is 1 if the firm belongs to an industry in the jth quartile
of similarity, 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by firm. p-values are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A. Industry Quartile Analysis using 4-digit SIC code
GrossMargin R&D/SALE EBITDA/SALE NI/SALE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Post -0.008 -0.000 0.047 0.065∗
(0.582) (0.984) (0.147) (0.067)
Treated x Post -0.023 0.062∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗
(0.320) (0.049) (0.002) (0.001)
Sim. Quartile 2 Dummy 0.044∗ -0.030∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Treated x Sim. Quartile 2 Dummy -0.045 0.017 -0.048 -0.130
(0.497) (0.655) (0.697) (0.424)
Post x Sim. Quartile 2 Dummy -0.035∗ 0.022∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.057) (0.001) (0.001)
Treated x Post x Sim. Quartile 2 Dummy 0.035 -0.042 0.342∗∗ 0.307∗∗
(0.335) (0.270) (0.010) (0.045)
Sim. Quartile 3 Dummy 0.071∗ -0.071∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Treated x Sim. Quartile 3 Dummy 0.001 0.030 0.086 0.308
(0.995) (0.468) (0.596) (0.171)
Post x Sim. Quartile 3 Dummy 0.049∗∗ 0.011 -0.083∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.234) (0.028) (0.002)
Treated x Post x Sim. Quartile 3 Dummy 0.132∗ -0.146∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sim. Quartile 4 Dummy 0.027 -0.011 0.094 0.087
(0.621) (0.613) (0.224) (0.343)
Treated x Sim. Quartile 4 Dummy 0.267∗ -0.084∗ 0.368∗∗ 0.615∗∗
(0.065) (0.056) (0.040) (0.014)
Post x Sim. Quartile 4 Dummy -0.054∗ 0.018∗ -0.087∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.064) (0.040) (0.009)
Treated x Post x Sim. Quartile 4 Dummy 0.148∗∗ -0.042 0.287∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗
(0.027) (0.223) (0.007) (0.039)
N 15337 15337 15337 15337
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.76 0.82 0.81
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal x Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B. Industry Quartile Analysis using FIC400 code
GrossMargin R&D/SALE EBITDA/SALE NI/SALE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Post 0.015 -0.012∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.106∗
(0.142) (0.077) (0.042) (0.066)
Treated x Post -0.048∗∗ 0.020 -0.087∗ -0.099
(0.041) (0.128) (0.095) (0.168)
Sim. Quartile 2 Dummy 0.015 -0.001 0.079∗ 0.083
(0.194) (0.850) (0.054) (0.109)
Treated x Sim. Quartile 2 Dummy -0.004 0.019 -0.084 -0.059
(0.948) (0.543) (0.471) (0.713)
Post x Sim. Quartile 2 Dummy -0.025∗ 0.013 -0.086∗∗ -0.098∗
(0.086) (0.114) (0.027) (0.081)
Treated x Post x Sim. Quartile 2 Dummy 0.023 -0.015 0.062 0.049
(0.539) (0.510) (0.445) (0.656)
Sim. Quartile 3 Dummy 0.033 -0.041∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗
(0.229) (0.001) (0.003) (0.012)
Treated x Sim. Quartile 3 Dummy 0.087 0.008 0.152 0.261
(0.318) (0.849) (0.366) (0.194)
Post x Sim. Quartile 3 Dummy 0.000 0.006 -0.051 -0.062
(0.996) (0.499) (0.174) (0.248)
Treated x Post x Sim. Quartile 3 Dummy 0.039 -0.034 0.085 0.077
(0.278) (0.159) (0.283) (0.465)
Sim. Quartile 4 Dummy 0.062∗ -0.056∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗
(0.065) (0.000) (0.001) (0.025)
Treated x Sim. Quartile 4 Dummy 0.014 0.002 0.108 0.213
(0.877) (0.968) (0.533) (0.317)
Post x Sim. Quartile 4 Dummy -0.034∗ 0.029∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗
(0.058) (0.031) (0.007) (0.034)
Treated x Post x Sim. Quartile 4 Dummy 0.114∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗
(0.001) (0.034) (0.003) (0.030)
N 15337 15337 15337 15337
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.61 0.71 0.75
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal x Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table C.10: GDP Price Index
This table reports the results for the difference-in-differences estimation using the M&A of fi-
nancial institutions as an exogenous shock to a firm’s common ownership level. The dependent
variable is Log of Price Index. Treated (control) firm is a firm in the portfolio of target or acquirer
that experienced (did not experience) an increase in common ownership post M&A. Industry is
defined using 4-digit SIC code in columns 1 and 2 and FIC400 code in columns 3 and 4. Similarity
quartile j is 1 if the firm belongs to an industry in the jth quartile of similarity, 0 otherwise. All
continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are clustered by
industry. p-values are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively.
SIC FIC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.010
(.) (0.609) (.) (0.350)
Post 0.047∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Treated x Post -0.044∗ -0.037∗ -0.043∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.050) (0.015) (0.010)
Sim. Quartile 2 Dummy 0.010 0.005 0.014 0.009
(0.523) (0.620) (0.196) (0.233)
Treated x Sim. Quartile 2 Dummy 0.006 0.032∗ -0.004 0.027∗∗
(0.806) (0.051) (0.879) (0.048)
Post x Sim. Quartile 2 Dummy -0.011 -0.002 -0.009 -0.001
(0.513) (0.850) (0.450) (0.901)
Treated x Post x Sim. Quartile 2 Dummy -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.017
(0.567) (0.410) (0.447) (0.340)
Sim. Quartile 3 Dummy 0.063∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.006) (0.002) (0.000)
Treated x Sim. Quartile 3 Dummy -0.004 0.022 -0.020 0.019
(0.936) (0.258) (0.597) (0.219)
Post x Sim. Quartile 3 Dummy -0.064∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Treated x Post x Sim. Quartile 3 Dummy 0.017 0.019 0.018 0.020
(0.530) (0.421) (0.383) (0.237)
Sim. Quartile 4 Dummy 0.109∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000)
Treated x Sim. Quartile 4 Dummy -0.048 -0.016 -0.066 -0.021
(0.408) (0.556) (0.186) (0.365)
Post x Sim. Quartile 4 Dummy -0.115 -0.107∗ -0.114∗ -0.106∗∗
(0.116) (0.098) (0.057) (0.045)
Treated x Post x Sim. Quartile 4 Dummy 0.084∗ 0.072∗ 0.085∗∗ 0.074∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.016) (0.012)
TSIM 0.088 0.139 -0.161 -0.127
(0.771) (0.580) (0.487) (0.489)
N 12286 12295 12286 12295
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.66 0.68 0.66
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal x Firm FE Yes No Yes No
Deal FE No Yes No Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table C.11: Long-term Investors
This table presents the results for the hypothesis that the effects of common ownership are con-
centrated in firms belonging to industries with high product similarity. The dependent variables
are gross margin (column 1), R&D to sales ratio (column 2), EBITDA to sales ratio (column 3),
and NI to sales ratio (column 4). The dependent variables are industry adjusted where industry
is defined using 4-digit SIC code in Panel A and FIC400 code in Panel B. Common ownership
is measured using dedicated and quasi-indexer investors and is measured as the total numbers of
shares owned by institutional investors that holds at least one other industry peer (ComOwn). The
regression includes all firm level control variables used in panel regressions.Variable definitions
are in Appendix A.1. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. Standard
errors are clustered by firm. p-values are in parentheses.
Panel A. Defining industry using 4-digit SIC code
GrossMargin R&D/SALE EBITDA/SALE NI/SALE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 1 -0.003∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.009∗∗
(0.076) (0.001) (0.285) (0.029)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 2 -0.004∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.012∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.000) (0.350) (0.001)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 3 0.009∗∗∗ -0.002∗ 0.006 0.012∗∗
(0.000) (0.099) (0.591) (0.020)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 4 0.023∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 59987 59987 59987 59987
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.63 0.50 0.62
Control Var Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value(4-1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Panel B. Defining industry using FIC400 code
GrossMargin R&D/SALE EBITDA/SALE NI/SALE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 1 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.000
(0.583) (0.259) (0.644) (0.967)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 2 -0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ -0.013∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.033) (0.094) (0.000)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 3 0.007∗∗∗ -0.002∗ 0.003 0.006
(0.002) (0.071) (0.804) (0.170)
ComOwn Similarity Quartile 4 0.017∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
N 59987 59987 59987 59987
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.50 0.47 0.57
Control Var Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value(4-1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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APPENDIX D
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS FOR SECTION 3
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Table D.1: Variable Definitions
Explanatory Variables:
Overconfident An indicator variable for overconfident CEOs. Following Campbell et al. (2011), a
CEO is identified as overconfident if they hold options that are at least 67% in the
money, at least twice during their tenure. The classification begins from the first time
they display such behavior.
Treated An indicator variable for firms in industries that are face to tariffs cuts at least 3.5
times higher than the median tariff cut during the sample.
Post An indicator variable for years after tariff cuts described above.
Outcome Variables:
Gross Margin Gross profit (SALE - COGS) divided by sales (SALE)
Operating Margin Operating profit (SALE - COGS - XSGA) divided by sales (SALE)
R&D/Sales The ratio of R&D expenses (XRD) to sales (SALE). Missing R&D expenses are re-
placed by 0.
Advertising/Sales The ratio of advertising expenses (XAD) to sales (SALE). Missing advertising ex-
penses are replaced by 0.
Ln(Market Share) Natural log of ratio of sale (SALE) to total industry sales, where industry is defined
using the 4-digit SIC code (SICH)
Q Tobin’s Q defined as the ratio of a firm’s market value of assets (AT + MVE - CEQ -
TXDITC) to book value of assets (AT)
Control Variables:
Log Assets Natural log of total assets (AT)
Leverage Long term debt (DLTT) divided by total assets (AT)
Log MB Natural log of Market to Book ratio, defined as market value of equity plus book value
of debt divided by total assets. (CSHO x PRCCF + DLC + DLTT)/AT
Cash/Assets Ratio of cash (CHE) holdings and total assets (AT)
Cash Flow/Assets Ratio of income before extraordinary items cash flow (IBC) to total assets (AT)
Idiosyncratic Volatility Mean squared error obtained from regressing daily firm stock returns on Fama-French
three factors model for a year.
Log Delta Natural log of (1+Delta), where Delta is the change in a manager’s wealth for a 1%
change in a firm’s stock price.
Log Vega Natural log of (1+Vega), where Vega is the change in a manager’s wealth for a 0.01
change in standard deviation of a firm’s stock returns.
CEO Duality An indicator variable for firm years in which the CEO is also the chairman of the
board




FIGURE FOR SECTION 3
Distribution of Tariff Cuts for manufacturing firms (SIC 2000-3999) from 1992-2012. Cut is defined as a dummy = 1
if the tariff reduction was at least 3.5 times the median reduction over the years and was not followed by an equivalent
increase. Y-axis the number of unique industries that experienced a cut in the given year.
Figure E.1: Distribution of Tariff Cuts
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APPENDIX F
TABLES FOR SECTION 3
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Table F.1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A presents the summary statistics of the complete sample. Panel B compares the treated
firms and the matched control firms on the covariates used for matching. Treatment firms are
defined as firms in industries that experience a tariff reduction of at least 3.5 times larger than the
median tariff reduction. The sample begins with all firm-years from 1992 to 2012 with non-missing
matching variables. For each treated firm, we find a control firm in the same year, with the same
level of CEO optimism (Overconfident: 0 or 1) with the minimum Mahanalobis distance based on
the variables presented in the table. The Mahanalobis distance between two firms j and k is given
by
√
((xj−xk)′W−1x (xj−xk)) where, x is a vector of covariates and W is the variance-covariance
matrix of the covariates. The matching process is described in detail in section 3.3.3 of the text.
The last column gives the p-value of Satterthwaite’s t-tests assuming unequal variances. Panel C
reports the parallel trend tests for our dependent variables. The last column gives the p-values for
the difference in means tests for the average growth rate from t-4 to t-1. For each outcome variable,
we calculated year on year percentage growth from t-4 to t-1 and averaged out the three percentage
changes. If data was missing for t-4, we averaged out two data points. If data was also missing
for t-3, we used the previous year percentage growth. Panel C presents the year-over-year changes
(∆) in the outcome variables among the treatment and matched control samples between years -4
and -1 relative to the corresponding tariff shock year. All variables are defined in Appendix D.1.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
N Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th
Firm Characteristics
Log Assets 1994 7.46 1.49 6.54 7.47 8.48
Log Market to Book 1994 0.44 0.65 -0.04 0.37 0.86
Leverage Ratio 1994 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.17 0.28
Cash to Assets 1994 0.14 0.18 0.02 0.06 0.17
Cash Flow to Assets 1994 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.1
Idiosyncratic Volatility 1994 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
Operating Margin 1994 0.09 0.45 0.09 0.14 0.21
Gross Margin 1994 0.33 0.44 0.22 0.37 0.56
R&D to Sale 1994 0.09 0.19 0 0.03 0.1
Ad to Sale 1994 0.01 0.03 0 0 0
Market Share 1994 0.21 0.26 0.03 0.1 0.32
Log Market Share 1994 -2.53 1.76 -3.54 -2.27 -1.13
Tobin’s Q 1994 2.14 1.18 1.25 1.72 2.68
CEO related variables
Overconfidence Dummy 1994 0.61 0.49 0 1 1
Log Delta 1994 5.58 1.32 4.68 5.49 6.48
Log Vega 1994 4 1.38 3.18 4.05 4.88
CEO Duality 1994 0.72 0.45 0 1 1
Male CEO 1994 0.99 0.09 1 1 1
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Panel B: Differences in firm-characteristics post-match
N Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th p-value
Log Assets Treated 168 7.15 1.6 5.92 7.01 8.38 0.39
Control 168 7.29 1.42 6.57 7.31 8.09
Log Market to Book Treated 168 0.42 0.55 -0.02 0.44 0.81 0.7
Control 168 0.4 0.54 0.06 0.32 0.73
Leverage Ratio Treated 168 0.16 0.14 0.04 0.14 0.27 0.97
Control 168 0.16 0.12 0.05 0.15 0.24
Cash/Assets Treated 168 0.15 0.19 0.03 0.07 0.18 0.24
Control 168 0.13 0.18 0.01 0.05 0.16
Cash Flow/Assets Treated 168 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.11
Control 168 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.09
Log Delta Treated 168 5.33 1.34 4.38 5.19 6.26 0.86
Control 168 5.36 1.03 4.59 5.23 6.01
Log Vega Treated 168 3.62 1.39 2.84 3.53 4.56 0.27
Control 168 3.77 1.08 3.07 3.84 4.51
Overconfidence Dummy Treated 168 0.58 0.5 0 1 1 0.27
Control 168 0.52 0.5 0 1 1
Idiosyncratic Volatility Treated 168 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.92
Control 168 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
CEO Duality Treated 168 0.66 0.47 0 1 1 0.16
Control 168 0.73 0.44 0 1 1
Turnover Dummy Treated 168 0.07 0.26 0 0 0 0.66
Control 168 0.06 0.24 0 0 0
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Panel C: Parallel Trends Test
Difference in Variables Untreated Treated p-value
∆ Operating Margin 0.016 0.025 0.57
∆ Gross Margin 0.010 0.009 0.90
∆ R&D/Sale 0.001 0.002 0.98
∆ AdExp/Sale -0.004 -0.002 0.27
∆ Market Share 0.055 0.047 0.79
∆ Q 0.000 -0.006 0.89
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Table F.2: Results of Triple Difference Regressions for Operating and Gross Margins
Panel A [Panel B] of this table shows the effect of overconfident CEOs on Operating Margin
[Gross Margin] following tariff shocks using the sample of treated and matched control firms.
The sample begins with all firm-years from 1992 to 2012 with non-missing matching variables.
Treatment firms are defined as firms in industries that experience a tariff reduction of a magnitude
which is at least 3.5 times larger than the median tariff reduction. For each treated firm, we find a
control firm in the same year, with the same level of CEO optimism (Overconfident: 0 or 1) with
the minimum Mahanalobis distance based on the variables presented in Table F.1, Panel A. The
matching process is described in detail in section 3.3.3 of the text. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) use
the sample within a one-year (-1, +1), two-year (-2, +2), three-year (-3, +3), and four-year (-4, +4)
window around the tariff shock, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix D.1. Standard
errors are clustered within industry defined by four-digit SIC codes. p-values are in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Operating Margin
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4)
Post x Overconfident x Treated -0.295*** -0.223*** -0.204** -0.171**
(0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Post -0.099 -0.094 -0.08 -0.059
(0.141) (0.129) (0.119) (0.170)
Overconfident 0.022 -0.013 -0.024 -0.025
(0.776) (0.736) (0.416) (0.372)
Post x Overconfident 0.142** 0.113* 0.099* 0.065
(0.023) (0.056) (0.050) (0.100)
Treated -0.121** -0.093** -0.101** -0.094**
(0.025) (0.032) (0.021) (0.027)
Post x Treated 0.112** 0.087* 0.088** 0.078**
(0.046) (0.052) (0.035) (0.036)
Overconfident x Treated 0.028 0.033 0.049 0.049
(0.713) (0.52) (0.235) (0.174)
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 670 1205 1639 1989
R2 0.676 0.648 0.632 0.631
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Panel B: Gross Margin
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4)
Post x Overconfident x Treated -0.173** -0.146** -0.141** -0.119**
(0.045) (0.017) (0.013) (0.02)
Post -0.006 -0.041 -0.04 -0.027
(0.880) (0.101) (0.105) (0.27)
Overconfident -0.002 -0.033 -0.047* -0.054**
(0.975) (0.208) (0.069) (0.039)
Post x Overconfident 0.04 0.054 0.063 0.044
(0.412) (0.116) (0.106) (0.215)
Treated -0.134** -0.113** -0.109** -0.093*
(0.012) (0.036) (0.032) (0.050)
Post x Treated 0.062 0.066 0.068* 0.054
(0.444) (0.211) (0.093) (0.167)
Overconfident x Treated 0.041 0.041 0.053 0.053
(0.526) (0.385) (0.202) (0.175)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 670 1205 1639 1989
R2 0.654 0.653 0.650 0.655
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Table F.3: Results of Triple Difference Regressions for R&D Expense to Sales
This table shows the effect of overconfident CEOs on R&D expenditure following tariff shocks
using the sample of treated and matched control firms. The sample begins with all firm-years
from 1992 to 2012 with non-missing matching variables. Treatment firms are defined as firms in
industries that experience a tariff reduction of a magnitude which is at least 3.5 times larger than the
median tariff reduction. For each treated firm, we find a control firm in the same year, with the same
level of CEO optimism (Overconfident: 0 or 1) with the minimum Mahanalobis distance based on
the variables presented in F.1, Panel A. The matching process is described in detail in section 3.3.3
of the text. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) use the sample within a one-year (-1, +1), two-year (-2,
+2), three-year (-3, +3), and four-year (-4, +4) window around the tariff shock, respectively. All
variables are defined in Appendix D.1. Standard errors are clustered within industry defined by
four-digit SIC codes. p-values are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at
10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4)
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.074*** 0.042* 0.035 0.025
(0.007) (0.072) (0.172) (0.304)
Post 0.029** 0.019* 0.014 0.007
(0.011) (0.064) (0.146) (0.399)
Overconfident 0.003 0.01 0.015 0.017
(0.865) (0.247) (0.119) (0.116)
Post x Overconfident -0.052** -0.033* -0.029 -0.018
(0.014) (0.064) (0.104) (0.287)
Treated 0.032** 0.022 0.021 0.016
(0.025) (0.182) (0.167) (0.246)
Post x Treated -0.042** -0.028** -0.030** -0.026*
(0.013) (0.047) (0.044) (0.057)
Overconfident x Treated -0.006 -0.005 -0.011 -0.013
(0.761) (0.689) (0.256) (0.247)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 670 1205 1639 1989
R2 0.851 0.838 0.823 0.818
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Table F.4: Results of Triple Difference Regressions for Ad Expense to Sales
This table shows the effect of overconfident CEOs on advertising expenditure following tariff
shocks using the sample of treated and matched control firms. The sample begins with all firm-
years from 1992 to 2012 with non-missing matching variables. Treatment firms are defined as
firms in industries that experience a tariff reduction of a magnitude which is at least 3.5 times
larger than the median tariff reduction. For each treated firm, we find a control firm in the same
year, with the same level of CEO optimism (Overconfident: 0 or 1) with the minimum Mahanalo-
bis distance based on the variables presented in F.1, Panel A. The matching process is described
in detail in section 3.3.3 of the text. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) use the sample within a one-
year (-1, +1), two-year (-2, +2), three-year (-3, +3), and four-year (-4, +4) window around the
tariff shock, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix D.1. Standard errors are clustered
within industry defined by four-digit SIC codes. p-values are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4)
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.006 0.010 0.013** 0.015**
(0.261) (0.110) (0.026) (0.010)
Post 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.009*
(0.269) (0.189) (0.119) (0.096)
Overconfident 0.007 0.006 0.008* 0.008*
(0.178) (0.153) (0.077) (0.065)
Post x Overconfident -0.008 -0.012** -0.013** -0.014**
(0.103) (0.045) (0.016) (0.011)
Treated 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.341) (0.484) (0.331) (0.228)
Post x Treated -0.005 -0.007 -0.009* -0.010*
(0.321) (0.196) (0.087) (0.054)
Overconfident x Treated -0.010* -0.006 -0.008* -0.009*
(0.093) (0.178) (0.088) (0.072)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 670 1205 1639 1989
R2 0.741 0.735 0.734 0.739
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Table F.5: Results of Triple Difference Regressions for Market Share
This table shows the effect of overconfident CEOs on market share following tariff shocks using
the sample of treated and matched control firms. The sample begins with all firm-years from 1992
to 2012 with non-missing matching variables. Treatment firms are defined as firms in industries
that experience a tariff reduction of a magnitude which is at least 3.5 times larger than the median
tariff reduction. For each treated firm, we find a control firm in the same year, with the same level
of CEO optimism (Overconfident: 0 or 1) with the minimum Mahanalobis distance based on the
variables presented in F.1, Panel A. The matching process is described in detail in section 3.3.3
of the text. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) use the sample within a one-year (-1, +1), two-year (-2,
+2), three-year (-3, +3), and four-year (-4, +4) window around the tariff shock, respectively. All
variables are defined in Appendix D.1. Standard errors are clustered within industry defined by
four-digit SIC codes. p-values are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at
10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4)
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.194* 0.294** 0.338** 0.342**
(0.099) (0.026) (0.024) (0.036)
Post 0.118 0.143** 0.169*** 0.198***
(0.142) (0.017) (0.006) (0.003)
Overconfident 0.275** 0.328*** 0.325*** 0.330***
(0.041) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Post x Overconfident -0.196** -0.288*** -0.333*** -0.366***
(0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Treated 0.174 0.201 0.191 0.199
(0.339) (0.254) (0.247) (0.203)
Post x Treated -0.165** -0.211** -0.206* -0.211*
(0.050) (0.016) (0.050) (0.064)
Overconfident x Treated -0.210 -0.245* -0.266* -0.272*
(0.172) (0.070) (0.055) (0.063)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 670 1205 1639 1989
R2 0.956 0.947 0.942 0.939
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Table F.6: Results of Triple Difference Regressions for Firm Value
This table shows the effect of overconfident CEOs on firm value (Tobin’s Q) following tariff shocks
using the sample of treated and matched control firms. The sample begins with all firm-years
from 1992 to 2012 with non-missing matching variables. Treatment firms are defined as firms in
industries that experience a tariff reduction of a magnitude which is at least 3.5 times larger than the
median tariff reduction. For each treated firm, we find a control firm in the same year, with the same
level of CEO optimism (Overconfident: 0 or 1) with the minimum Mahanalobis distance based on
the variables presented in F.1, Panel A. The matching process is described in detail in section 3.3.3
of the text. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) use the sample within a one-year (-1, +1), two-year (-2,
+2), three-year (-3, +3), and four-year (-4, +4) window around the tariff shock, respectively. All
variables are defined in Appendix D.1. Standard errors are clustered within industry defined by
four-digit SIC codes. p-values are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at
10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4)
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.354* 0.371** 0.278* 0.225
(0.066) (0.022) (0.062) (0.106)
Post -0.048 -0.006 0.068 0.089
(0.658) (0.924) (0.336) (0.257)
Overconfident 0.403*** 0.399*** 0.304*** 0.275***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Post x Overconfident -0.125 -0.085 -0.060 -0.069
(0.392) (0.363) (0.492) (0.416)
Treated -0.022 0.076 0.133 0.139*
(0.859) (0.397) (0.126) (0.082)
Post x Treated 0.060 0.009 -0.018 0.005
(0.641) (0.928) (0.851) (0.954)
Overconfident x Treated -0.261** -0.277*** -0.167 -0.157
(0.048) (0.008) (0.117) (0.135)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 670 1205 1639 1989
R2 0.728 0.722 0.726 0.725
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Table F.7: Placebo Test Using Treatment firms with Placebo “Treatment” in Non-tariff-cut years
This table presents placebo tests regarding the effect of overconfident CEOs on firm policies and
value following tariff shocks using the sample of treated and matched control firms. The sample
begins with all firm-years from 1992 to 2012 with non-missing matching variables. Treatment
firms are defined as firms in industries that experience a tariff reduction of a magnitude which
is at least 3.5 times larger than the median tariff reduction. We randomly assign “placebo” tariff
reductions to treated firms, using only years in which the firm was not subject to a tariff reduction.
We require that the placebo reduction year be at least four years from an actual tariff reduction.
Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) use the sample within a one-year (-1, +1), two-year (-2, +2), three-
year (-3, +3), and four-year (-4, +4) window around the tariff shock, respectively. All regressions
include industry and year fixed effects and controls as used in the main analysis. The variables are
defined in Appendix D.1. Standard errors are clustered within industry defined by four-digit SIC
codes. p-values are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and
1% respectively.
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4)
Panel A: Operating Margin
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.006 -0.035 -0.013 0.029
(0.902) (0.326) (0.780) (0.636)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 996 1864 2628 3305
R2 0.495 0.500 0.527 0.543
Panel B: Gross Margin
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.042 0.036 0.066 0.088
(0.467) (0.616) (0.416) (0.355)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 996 1864 2628 3305
R2 0.434 0.442 0.450 0.453
Panel C: R&D/Sale
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.005 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.803) (0.987) (0.997) (0.946)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 996 1860 2622 3297
R2 0.727 0.723 0.734 0.741
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(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4)
Panel C: Advertising/Sale
Post x Overconfident x Treated -0.003 -0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.251) (0.895) (0.408) (0.598)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 996 1860 2622 2297
R2 0.631 0.640 0.650 0.655
Panel D: Ln(Market Share)
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.016 0.014 0.018 0.063
(0.824) (0.860) (0.823) (0.449)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 996 1864 2628 3305
R2 0.961 0.960 0.960 0.959
Panel E: Tobin’s Q
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.005 -0.009 0.004 0.051
(0.978) (0.961) (0.970) (0.662)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 996 1864 2628 3305
R2 0.784 0.772 0.761 0.760
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Table F.8: Placebo Test Using Non-Treated Manufacturing Firms with Placebo “Treatment” in
Tariff-cut years
This table presents the results of a placebo test where firms in manufacturing industries that never
experienced a tariff cut are randomly assigned a tariff cut in the same year as the actual tariff
cut. These “pseudo-treated” firm-years are matched with a set of control firms following the same
algorithm used in our main tests. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) use the sample within a one-year
(-1, +1), two-year (-2, +2), three-year (-3, +3), and four-year (-4, +4) window around the tariff
shock, respectively. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects and controls as used in
the main analysis. The variables are defined in Appendix D.1. Standard errors are clustered within
industry defined by four-digit SIC codes. p-values are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4)
Panel A: Operating Margin
Post x Overconfident x Treated -0.067 -0.075 -0.055 -0.062
(0.191) (0.151) (0.246) (0.194)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 523 938 1277 1543
R2 0.360 0.361 0.365 0.372
Panel B: Gross Margin
Post x Overconfident x Treated -0.032 -0.038 -0.040 -0.052
(0.442) (0.351) (0.318) (0.213)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 523 938 1277 1543
R2 0.581 0.552 0.542 0.529
Panel C: R&D/Sale
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.013 0.000 -0.011 -0.015
(0.568) (0.990) (0.631) (0.473)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 523 938 1277 1 543
R2 0.731 0.696 0.698 0.712
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(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4)
Panel C: Advertising/Sale
Post x Overconfident x Treated -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.004
(0.726) (0.649) (0.631) (0.550)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 523 938 1277 1543
R2 0.757 0.760 0.743 0.733
Panel D: Ln(Market Share)
Post x Overconfident x Treated -0.195 -0.096 0.052 0.045
(0.198) (0.510) (0.693) (0.740)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 523 938 1277 1543
R2 0.965 0.960 0.957 0.957
Panel E: Tobin’s Q
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.060 0.282 0.101 0.103
(0.834) (0.140) (0.557) (0.479)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 523 938 1277 1543
R2 0.739 0.725 0.726 0.730
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Table F.9: Placebo Test using non-Manufacturing Firms with Placebo “Treatment” in tariff-cut
years
This table presents the results of the placebo test where firms in non-manufacturing industries
are randomly assigned a tariff cut in the same year as the actual tariff cut. These 168 “pseudo-
treated” firm-years are matched with a set of control firms following the same algorithm used in
our main tests. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) use the sample within a one-year (-1, +1), two-year
(-2, +2), three-year (-3, +3), and four-year (-4, +4) window around the tariff shock, respectively.
All regressions include industry and year fixed effects and controls as used in the main analysis.
The variables are defined in Appendix D.1. Standard errors are clustered within industry defined
by four-digit SIC codes. p-values are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4)
Panel A: Operating Margin
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.004 -0.009 -0.008 0.001
(0.741) (0.645) (0.660) (0.969)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 659 1180 1598 1950
R2 0.803 0.725 0.736 0.694
Panel B: Gross Margin
Post x Overconfident x Treated -0.011 -0.021 -0.019 -0.023
(0.489) (0.353) (0.411) (0.342)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 659 1180 1598 1950
R2 0.754 0.725 0.725 0.716
Panel C: R&D/Sale
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.000 0.007 0.009 0.007
(0.992) (0.198) (0.307) (0.520)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 659 1180 1598 1950
R2 0.860 0.845 0.831 0.827
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(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4)
Panel C: Advertising/Sale
Post x Overconfident x Treated -0.003 -0.003* -0.003 -0.002
(0.137) (0.096) (0.150) (0.333)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 659 1180 1598 1950
R2 0.646 0.619 0.620 0.617
Panel D: Ln(Market Share)
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.103 0.008 -0.027 -0.097
(0.313) (0.947) (0.818) (0.404)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 659 1180 1598 1950
R2 0.943 0.937 0.932 0.931
Panel E: Tobin’s Q
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.108 -0.005 -0.056 -0.079
(0.468) (0.970) (0.645) (0.484)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 659 1180 1598 1950
R2 0.744 0.726 0.708 0.693
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Table F.10: Results of Triple Difference Regressions for Different Types of Investment
This table shows total investment scaled by sales (Panel A), R&D/Sales (Panel B), CAPEX/Sales
(Panel C), and cash outflows for acquisitions scaled by sales (Panel D). Columns (1), (2), (3) and
(4) use the sample within a one-year (-1, +1), two-year (-2, +2), three-year (-3, +3), and four-year
(-4, +4) window around the tariff shock, respectively. All regressions include industry and year
fixed effects and controls as used in the main analysis. The variables are defined in Appendix
D.1. Standard errors are clustered within industry defined by four-digit SIC codes. p-values are in
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Investment/Sales
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4)
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.089** 0.061* 0.063 0.046
(0.029) (0.095) (0.104) (0.230)
Post 0.037* 0.018 0.019 0.008
(0.095) (0.332) (0.246) (0.575)
Overconfident -0.011 -0.012 0.001 0.008
(0.657) (0.541) (0.972) (0.681)
Post x Overconfident -0.058** -0.041 -0.044 -0.029
(0.037) (0.114) (0.102) (0.225)
Treated 0.041 0.012 0.022 0.016
(0.115) (0.691) (0.323) (0.400)
Post x Treated -0.068** -0.051* -0.070** -0.056**
(0.026) (0.054) (0.011) (0.019)
Overconfident x Treated 0.013 0.021 0.002 0.001
(0.674) (0.429) (0.918) (0.953)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 670 1205 1639 1989
R2 0.747 0.715 0.703 0.696
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Panel B: R&D/Sales
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4)
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.074*** 0.042* 0.035 0.025
(0.007) (0.072) (0.172) (0.304)
Post 0.029** 0.019* 0.014 0.007
(0.011) (0.064) (0.146) (0.399)
Overconfident 0.003 0.01 0.015 0.017
(0.865) (0.247) (0.119) (0.116)
Post x Overconfident -0.052** -0.033* -0.029 -0.018
(0.014) (0.064) (0.104) (0.287)
Treated 0.032** 0.022 0.021 0.016
(0.025) (0.182) (0.167) (0.246)
Post x Treated -0.042** -0.028** -0.030** -0.026*
(0.013) (0.047) (0.044) (0.057)
Overconfident x Treated -0.006 -0.005 -0.011 -0.013
(0.761) (0.689) (0.256) (0.247)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 670 1205 1639 1989
R2 0.851 0.838 0.823 0.818
Panel C: CAPEX/Sales
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4)
Post x Overconfident x Treated 0.022* 0.015 0.009 0.004
(0.098) (0.291) (0.539) (0.795)
Post 0.020* 0.009 0.004 0
(0.077) (0.225) (0.525) (0.965)
Overconfident -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 -0.001
(0.714) (0.264) (0.407) (0.853)
Post x Overconfident -0.025** -0.017 -0.013 -0.01
(0.024) (0.113) (0.194) (0.269)
Treated -0.004 -0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.628) (0.564) (0.743) (0.752)
Post x Treated -0.021* -0.014 -0.014 -0.009
(0.073) (0.141) (0.157) (0.304)
Overconfident x Treated 0.019 0.020** 0.016* 0.013
(0.171) (0.019) (0.070) (0.129)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 670 1205 1639 1989
R2 0.51 0.494 0.466 0.443
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Panel D: AQC/Sales
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4)
Post x Overconfident x Treated -0.002 0.004 0.019 0.018
(0.931) (0.812) (0.267) (0.274)
Post -0.008 -0.008 0.004 0.004
(0.530) (0.435) (0.641) (0.587)
Overconfident -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003
(0.939) (0.638) (0.765) (0.720)
Post x Overconfident 0.013 0.005 -0.006 -0.005
(0.377) (0.701) (0.613) (0.665)
Treated 0.019 -0.004 0 -0.002
(0.182) (0.820) (0.964) (0.869)
Post x Treated -0.01 -0.012 -0.028* -0.024*
(0.526) (0.381) (0.062) (0.072)
Overconfident x Treated -0.004 0.002 -0.004 0
(0.809) (0.931) (0.757) (0.975)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 670 1205 1639 1989
R2 0.223 0.201 0.183 0.169
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